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THE TRAGIC AND CHAOTIC AFTERMATH OF A BABY
SWITCH: SHOULD POLICY AND COMMON LAW, BLOOD
TIES, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL BONDS PREVAIL?
CYNTHiA R. MABRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Commonwealth of Virginia, a baby switch has inextrica,
bly entangled the lives of three families. In the summer of 1995,
Paula Johnson gave birth to a baby girl at the University of
Virginia Medical Center.' Since then, together with her ex-
boyfriend and the father of her daughter, Carlton Conley, Johnson
has been rearing a child named Callie Marie Johnson.2
Within a few hours of Callie Marie Conley's birth, Whitney
Rogers gave birth to a baby girl at the Medical Center.' Kevin
Chittum was Rogers's fianc6 and her daughter's father.4 On July
4, 1998, Rogers and Chittum were killed in a head-on collision in
Southwest Virginia.' As a result of their deaths, five grandpar-
ents-two more families-became embroiled in this drama. Linda
and Thomas Rogers are Whitney Rogers's parents.6 After they
divorced, Thomas married Brenda Rogers, his current wife.' Larry
and Rosa Lee Chittum are Kevin Chittum's parents.8 After Kevin
and Whitney died, the Rogerses and the Chittums began sharing
custody of Rebecca Grace Chittum. s She is the child Kevin and
Whitney brought home from the Medical Center in mid-1995.10
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1. See Justin Blum & Michael D. Shear, Of One Mind on Two Children, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 1998, at B1; Jerry Harris, How the Switch Came to Light, NEws-GAZE~rE (Lexington,
Virginia), Aug. 5, 1998, at A3.
2. See Blum & Shear, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.; Harris, supra note 1; Jerry Harris, Orphan Center of Baby Switch Story,
NEws-GAZE'TE (Lexington, Virginia), Aug. 5, 1998, at Al.
6. See John Cloud, Where Do They Belong?, TIME, Aug. 17, 1998, at 62, 65.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 64.
9. See Jerry Harris, Custody Suits, Wrongful Death Actions Filed, NEwS-GAZETTE
(Lexington, Virginia), Nov. 25, 1998, at A5.
10. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 62.
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Three years after Rebecca and Callie were born and just days
after Whitney and Kevin died, all three families learned that each
of the two mothers had taken the wrong baby home.' For some
unknown and perplexing reason, someone switched Rogers's baby
with Johnson's baby.'2 These circumstances raised several complex
family law issues that these families must confront. They must
resolve matters concerning parental rights, relatives' rights,
custody, visitation, child support, adoption, and inheritance rights,
to name a few.' 3 This Article identifies pertinent issues that arose
from this tragedy, predicts how a court of law would resolve those
issues, and suggests alternative resolutions that the families may
fashion with minimal court intervention.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Perhaps the greatest irony of this situation is that Rogers and
Johnson actually met at the Medical Center.'4 Their paths crossed
as they were taking a walk in the maternity ward, trying to induce
labor, on the night of June 29, 1995.16 The two women encountered
one another and talked briefly. 6 Johnson was a twenty-seven-year-
old single woman who was about to give birth to her third child.
17
Rogers, a sixteen-year-old cheerleader, unmarried and a sophomore
in high school, was going to give birth to her first child.'8 Johnson
recalled that Rogers was "warm and enthusiastic." 9
Later that night, at 11:12 p.m., Johnson gave birth to a baby
girl.2 ° A few hours later, on June 30, 1995, Rogers also gave birth
11. See Jerry Harris, DNA Results Expected Next Week, NEWS-GAZETTE (Lexington,
Virginia), Aug. 12, 1998, at Al (recounting that Rebecca Grace Chittum was tested to see if
she was the biological daughter of Paula Johnson and Carlton Conley); Harris, supra note
1 (indicating that a blood test had been run on Conley in connection with a dispute Johnson
and Conley had over child support for Callie).
12. See infra note 24 (discussing how the switch may have happened).
13. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Switched Babies' Families Face Many Complicated Issues,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Aug. 22, 1998, at A9 (listing relevant issues). Although
negligence and malpractice potentially are related issues, they are not addressed in this
Article.
14. See Justin Blum & Michael D. Shear, 2nd Family Wants to Keep Girl They Got in
Hospital Mix.up, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1998, at Al; Cloud, supra note 6, at 62; Tamara Jones
& Michael D. Shear, Baby Switch Leaves Disparate Lives Forever Entwined, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 1998, at Al.




19. Blum & Shear, supra note 14.
20. See id.
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to a girl.21 Both babies were healthy and blonde.22 Johnson says
that, on July 1st, between 2:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., her baby was in
the nursery.2" She believes that the switch occurred during those
hours.2 4
On July 1, 1995, the Medical Center discharged Johnson with
a baby girl. She took the child, to whom she thought she had given
birth, home.25 Six hours later, Johnson returned to the hospital
because the baby was not accepting nourishment.26 It was the first
ominous hint that something had gone awry. Although Johnson
gave birth to an infant Who weighed nine pounds and six ounces,
the baby she brought back to the hospital weighed only seven
pounds and twelve ounces. When Johnson inquired about the
21. See id.
22. See Blum & Shear, supra note 1.
23. See Michael D. Shear, Baby's Mother Zeroes in on Time that Switch Could Have
Occurred, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1998, at Bl.
24. See id. This is consistent with the results of the investigation by the University of
Virginia Police Department and the Virginia State Police:
The information available to investigators tends to suggest that the switch
occurred during the morning of July 1, 1995.... [Bjoth babies were present in
the nursery along with many others .... Weight and feeding records of the
Chittum and Conley babies from before 6 a.m. on July 1st show a significantly
heavier Conley baby with a healthy appetite in comparison with the much
lighter Chittum baby, who ate much smaller amounts. The recorded weights
and feeding histories of these babies after 8:30 a.m. on July 1st reflect the
reverse.
Report Excerpts, NEWS-GAZETTE (Lexington, Virginia), Nov. 25, 1998, at AS.
After a three-month investigation, investigators were unable to determine how or why
the switch occurred. One hypothesis is that the children's identification bracelets slipped off
and were switched when they were put back on the children. See Jerry Harris, Baby Switch
Ruled Unintentional, NEWS-GAZETrE (Lexington, Virginia), Nov. 25, 1998, at Al (finding no
.probable cause... [that] a criminal offense was committed" and that hospital negligence
was the most likely explanation); Michael D. Shear, Baby's Identity Bracelets Loose Enough
to Slip Off, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1998, at B [hereinafter Shear, Baby's Identity]. As a result
of this incident, the Medical Center is implementing new procedures to avoid loss of infant
identity bracelets and clamps in the future. See Michael D. Shear, Criminal Probe of Baby
Switching at U-Va. Nears End, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at Bl [hereinafter Shear,
Criminal Probe] (finding no answers for how the switch occurred); Michael D. Shear, U-Va.
to Test New Form of Infant Identification, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1998, at Bl [hereinafter
Shear, U.Va. To Test]. John T. Casteen III, the president of the University of Virginia, took
out whole page advertisements expressing his condolences and vowing to implement better
procedures where needed. See A Message from the University of Virginia, NEWS-GAZETE
(Lexington, Virginia), Aug. 19, 1998, at B16. Johnson has rejected a two million dollar
settlement offer from the State of Virginia. See Carlos Santos, Settlement Offers Made in
Baby Switch, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 1999, at Al.
25. See Shear, Baby's Identity, supra note 24.
26. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 65; Jones & Shear, supra note 14; Shear, Baby's Identity,
supra note 24.
27. See 20/20: Switched at Birth: Paula Johnson Tells Her Incredible Story (ABC
television broadcast, Aug. 14, 1998), available in 1998 WL 5433678 [hereinafter 20/20:
Switched at Birth]; Cloud, supra note 6, at 65.
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weight discrepancy, Medical Center employees shrugged it off as
"something that just happens."" Later, Johnson would learn that
this was the exact birth weight of Whitney Rogers's daughter.2 9 The
Medical Center discharged Rogers on July 2, 1995, and Rogers took
her baby girl, the one Medical Center attendants handed to her,
home.3 ° Those events occurred in 1995. For more than three years,
the Johnson, Rogers, and Chittum families nurtured these girls and
watched them grow as they discovered the world. In 1998, all three
families' worlds turned upside down.
This saga began unfolding when Conley fought against an
increase in his child support payments in January 1998.31 Johnson
insisted that Conley increase the seventy-five dollar a week child
support payments he voluntarily had been making to cover Callie
Marie's needs.32 Johnson and Conley often argued about the
amount of monetary support that Conley provided.33 This time,
Conley refused to pay more and denied parentage.34 In retaliation,
Johnson filed a child support claim against Conley in a Virginia
court.35 To resolve the paternity and child support disputes, a judge
in the Greene County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
ordered Johnson, Callie Marie, and Conley to undergo deoxyribonu-
cleic acid (DNA) testing to ascertain whether Conley was Callie
Marie's biological father.36
28. 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
29. See id.; see also Deborah Kelly, Did U. VA Miss Clue, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Aug.
9, 1998, at Al (discussing the hospital's failure to notice a twenty percent weight difference).
30. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 62; Harris, supra note 1; Kelly, supra note 29.
31. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Cloud, supra note 6, at 65; Harris,
supra note 1.
32. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27 Cloud, supra note 6, at 65.
33. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
34. See id. Conley says that his lawyer told him to contest paternity. See id.
35. See Blum & Shear, supra note 1.
36. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27. Virginia statutory law permits
determination of parentage through "scientifically reliable genetic tests." VA. CODE ANN. §§
20-49.1(B), 20-49.3(A), 20-66.1 (Michie 1998). Virginia's filiation or paternity proceedings are
designed to identify a child's biological parents. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 to .9 (Michie
1998). These proceedings are held in order to identify the people responsible for supporting
the child so that she does not become a ward of the state. When a putative father denies
parentage, the court may order him to submit to a paternity test. See § 20-49.3 (declaring
the admissibility of the tests).
The deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, test, which uses a buccal swab, provides
conclusive proof of parentage. See Commonwealth ex rel. Comptroller v. Flaneary, 469
S.E.2d 79, 80 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that DNA test establishing paternity with over
98% probability was a finding of parentage as a matter of law); see also Hamm v. Office of
Child Support Enforcement, 985 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Ark. 1999) (explaining the testing process);
Cable v. Anthou, 699 A.2d 722, 723, 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (acknowledging the accuracy
of DNA testing using a buccal); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 781-82 (Va.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990) (admitting the tests in Virginia in criminal
[Vol. 6:1
1999] THE TRAGIC AND CHAOTIC AFTERMATH OF A BABY SWITCH 5
On July 2, 1998, the court revealed some astonishing news.
The DNA test results showed that neither Conley nor Johnson
possessed a genetic link to Callie Marie.37 Johnson contacted her
attorney, and her attorney contacted Medical Center officials.3"
After assuring counsel that procedures for banding the baby and
the mother with identity bracelets had been followed, Medical
Center officials launched an investigation.39
During the investigation, the officials determined that Rebecca
Chittum, a little girl living in Buena Vista, Virginia, could be
Johnson's and Conley's biological child.4" On July 21, 1998, a
doctor and a nurse from the Medical Center traveled to Linda
Rogers's residence and took a blood sample from Rebecca.4' Weeks
later, to her grandparents' chagrin, the test results conclusively
established that Rebecca, the child whom Kevin and Whitney
reared for more than three years, actually was Johnson's child.42
Another test revealed that Rebecca was Conley's child.43
III. THE RIGHTS OF REBECCA'S BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
A critical question that arises from the Medical Center baby
switch is who is entitled to have custody," meaning possession and
control, of Rebecca. The United States Supreme Court usually
declines to address matters concerning domestic relations,45 but, on
proceedings and explaining the testing process). See generally Christopher Blakesley,
Scientific Testing and Proof of Paternity: Some Controversy and Key Issues for Family Law
Counsel, 57 LA. L. REV. 379 (1997) (discussing various methods for establishing paternity);
Linda L. Lemmon & Lynn K. Murphy, The Evidentiary Use of HLA Blood Test in Virginia,
19 U. RICH. L. REv. 235 (1985) (discussing the use of the Human Leukocyte Antigen test-a
test on white blood cells); William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA 1 ping: Acceptance and
Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989) (examining how
courts look at DNA typing evidence).
37. See Justin Blum, Genetic Tests Confirm U-Va. Baby Swap, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1998,
at B3; DNA Test Confirms Second Half of Baby Switch, CNN.COM (Sept. 1, 1998)
<http://cnn.com/US/9809/01/switched.babies/> [hereinafter DNA Test Confirms].
38. See Justin Blum & Michael D. Shear, A Small Child, A Large Question, WASH. POST,
Aug. 2, 1998, at B1.
39. See id.
40. See Dennis Cauchon, Va. Babies Switched at Birth 3 Years Ago, USA TODAY, July 31,
1998, at 1A.
41. See Family Authorizes Genetic Test in Baby Switching Case, CNN.cOM (Aug. 6, 1998)
<httpJ/cnn.com/US/9808/06/switched.babies.01/> [hereinafter Family Authorizes]; Jones &
Shear, supra note 14.
42. See Blum, supra note 37; DNA Test Confirms, supra note 37.
43. See Blum, supra note 37.
44. See Mabry, supra note 13 (discussing the many issues involved in establishing
custody of the girls).
45. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (reaffirming the domestic
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many occasions, the Court has defined as fundamental a parent's
right to nurture and rear her own child." The Supreme Court
based these rulings on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.47 The Court reasoned that the liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment include the right to "bring
up children."48 Almost six decades after establishing the right, the
Supreme Court recently emphasized that the "historical recognition
that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 9
Generally, the rights of biological parents are superior to the
claims of all other third persons.' In Virginia, the court will honor
"the primacy of the parent-child relationship."51  The policy
underlying these rights is that "society has made a judgment that
these non-interventionist rules are best for children .... Empower-
ing parents, therefore, represents a means of ensuring that such
decisions will be made by someone who presumably will act in the
children's best interests. 52
relations exception that "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and
child custody decrees").
46. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); accord Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 747 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); In re M.M.L., 900 P.2d 813, 819 (Kan. 1995);
Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A-2d 30, 36-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); In re Drinnon, 776
S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); see also John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale
for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 351 (1998) (discussing
natural parents' successful attempts to resist visitation by non-parents).
'47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
48. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. A biological parent also has the right to custody or visitation,
to develop a relationship with her child, to manage the child, and to share the child's
companionship. See Uhing v. Uhing, 488 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Neb. 1992) (listing parental and
children's rights).
49. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
50. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; In re Adoption of L., 462 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Va. 1995). But see In re Marriage of
Liebich, 547 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (awarding custody to a grandmother who
had cared for the child for eight years); Locklin v. Duka, 929 P.2d 930, 933-36 (Nev. 1996)
(enumerating factors which constitute circumstances that overcome the presumption in favor
of parental custody).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 1998).
52. Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado about Nothing?, in
CHILD, PARENT, & STATE: LAW AND Poucy READER 27,28 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994)
(explaining how the presumption works); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
(recognizing that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children"); In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (discussing how a
biological parent has a right to custody of a child superior to all others, unless that parent
abandons this right or is proven unfit, even if the State can find "better" parents); Christi Gill
Baunach, Note, The Role of Equitable Adoption in a Mistaken Baby Switch, 31 U. LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 501, 510 (1992) (describing the presumption that "giving custody to a biological
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A. Awarding Custody
Following these principles, state courts, including those in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, apply a strong presumption that "a
child's best interest will be served" when she is placed in the
custody of her biological parents." Johnson and Conley are
Rebecca's biological parents. They do not live together now and do
not intend to live together in the future.' Therefore, in most states,
a court would rely upon the "best interests" standard55 to determine
whether custody should be awarded to one or both parents. Criteria
that a court may use to discern whether awarding custody of
Rebecca to Conley and/or Johnson would be in Rebecca's best
interests are enumerated in section 20-124.3 of the Virginia Code:
1. The age and physical and mental condition of the child...;
2. The age and physical and mental condition of each parent;
3. The relationship existing between each parent and each child
4. The needs of the child, giving due consideration to other
important relationships of the child, including but not limited
to siblings, peers and extended family members;
5. The role which each parent has played and will play in the
future, in the upbringing and care of the child;
6. The propensity of each parent to actively support the child's
contact and relationship with the other parent, the relative
willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to maintain
a close and continuing relationship with the child, and the
ability of each parent to cooperate in matters affecting the child;
7. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and
experience to express such a preference;
8. Any history of family abuse... ; and such other factors as
the court deems necessary and proper to the determination.56
parent necessarily serves the best interest of the child").
53. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Va. 1995) (quoting Judd v. Van Horn, 81
S.E.2d 432, 436 (Va. 1954)); accord Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1993);
Walker v. Fagg, 400 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Va. 1991); Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 244 (Va.
1989); Smith v. Pond, 360 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Va. 1987); Patrick v. Byerley, 325 S.E.2d 99, 101
(Va. 1985); Judd v. Van Horn, 81 S.E.2d 432, 436 (Va. 1954).
54. See generally 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
55. See sources cited in supra notes 52-53 for a discussion of the "best interests of the
child" standard.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1998).
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A majority of states rely upon similar statutory factors to make
custody and visitation decisions.57 In Virginia, joint or sole custody
is allowed.56 A brief review of the factors utilized in Virginia
indicates that Johnson probably would receive sole custody of
Rebecca.
1. The Parents' and the Child's Age and Physical and
Mental Condition
Rebecca is four years old and healthy, with no mental or
physical disabilities or special needs.5 9 Johnson and Conley are
relatively young adults. Conley is thirty-four years old; Johnson is
thirty years old. 0 Neither of them possesses physical or mental
incapacities that would render one unable to care for Rebecca.6 '
Under the circumstances presented, this factor does not weigh in
favor of or against either Johnson or Conley.
2. Child's Relationship with Her Parents
Johnson and Conley have met Rebecca and visited her. 2 They
have not, however, had sufficient opportunity to develop fully a
relationship with their biological child because Rebecca has been
57. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A) (West Supp. 1998); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
124 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3) (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3) (West
Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Michie 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, §
31 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1) (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2)
(West 1997 & Supp. 1999); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(4) (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.2 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(FX1) (West 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-
106 (Supp. 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1998). But see generally Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)
(announcing the primary caretaker presumption).
58. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(A) (Michie 1998); see also Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d
964, 966-67 (Md. 1986) (explaining different variations of joint custody); D. Lee
Khachaturian, Domestic Violence and Shared Parental Responsibility: Dangerous
Bedfellows, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1745, 1761-64 (1999) (defining joint legal and joint physical
custody).
59. Callie Marie and Rebecca were born on June 29 and 30, 1995, respectively. See A
Tale of Two Babies, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1998, at B8. There is no indication of disease or
disability in either child. See Blum & Shear, supra note 1.
60. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 64 (reporting that Johnson is 30 years old); Jones &
Shear, supra note 14 (providing ages for Conley and Johnson); Two Families Want to Adopt
Switched Baby, CNN.COM (Aug. 19, 1998) <http://cnn.com/US/9808/19/switched.babies.
02/index.html/> [hereinafter Two Families] (telling Conley's age).
61. See Families of Switched Babies Seek Custody Solution, CNN.cOM (Aug. 4, 1998)
<http://cnn.com/US/9808/04/switched.babies.03/>.
62. See 20/20: Switched at Birth-Paula Johnson's Incredible Story (ABC television
broadcast, Dec. 25, 1998), available in 1998 WL 5433846 [hereinafter 20/20: Switched at
Birth 2].
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living with people who are unrelated to her. Consequently, at this
point, it is safe to say that they are attempting to develop a
meaningful relationship with their child. 3 Yet, because they have
not maintained a relationship with Rebecca, this factor may weigh
in favor of the putative grandparents keeping Rebecca."
3. Child's Relationships with Others
In addition to Callie, Johnson cares for her three sons and an
adopted daughter-Rebecca's siblings.65 Courts have determined
that keeping siblings together is an important consideration."s One
court stated that it was "well recognized that the love and affection
of a brother and sister ... is important in the lives of both of
them."67  The policy that buttresses this legal principle is an
"assumption that separation of children from each other will further
weaken familial ties.., and.., endanger the children's emotional
well-being. The potential for future bonding between siblings who
are very young ... militates in favor of keeping the children toget-
her." 8 Therefore, in making placement decisions, courts endeavor
to order the same placement for siblings. Even though Callie and
Rebecca have not lived with their siblings, leaving the children
where they are may deprive them of the opportunity to know and
love their consanguineous siblings.
63. See id.
64. See infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text (discussing the grandparents' custody
chances).
65. See 20/20: Switched at Birth 2, supra note 62 (stating that Johnson has three boys);
Cloud, supra note 6, at 64 (reporting that Johnson has three boys and custody of a 16-year-
old girl). But see Baby-Switch Mother Loses Custody of Son, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1999 (noting
a change in custody of one of Johnson's sons to his father).
66. See McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421, 425 (Alaska 1995); Adoption of Hugo, 700
N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass. 1998), cert. denied, Hugo P. v. George P., 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999);
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 215 (Minn. 1988); In re Marriage of Moe, 676 P.2d 336,
338 (Or. 1984); Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah 1985); Hughes v. Gentry,
443 S.E.2d 448, 451-52 (Va. 1994); Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993); Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, Child Custody: Separating Children by Custody Awards to Different
Parents-Post-1975 Cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 354, 360 (1989). But see Scruggs v. Saterfiel, 693 So.
2d 924, 926 (Miss. 1997) (finding no statutory basis for visitation between siblings that were
placed with separate guardians); Harris v. Harris, 647 A.2d 309, 314 (Vt. 1994) (concluding
that the reasonableness of splitting siblings was supported by the evidence).
67. Scruggs, 693 So. 2d at 926 (quoting Mixon v. Bullard, 217 So. 2d 28, 30-31 (Miss.
1968)).
68. Harris, 647 A.2d at 313 (citation omitted); accord In re Marriage of Fynaardt, 545
N.W.2d 890, 893 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the separation of siblings "deprives
children of the benefit of constant association with each other" (citation omitted)); Honaker
v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 324-26 (W. Va. 1989) (awarding custody to biological parent and
visitation rights to the half-sibling).
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4. The Role Played by the Parents
Again, Conley and Johnson have not had an opportunity to play
an influential role in Rebecca's life because she is living with her
grandparents in Buena Vista.6" Relatives and friends have
reported, however, that Conley has been a doting father to Callie.7°
Likewise, Johnson has been a good mother to both Callie and her
other children.7 ' Most likely, both parents would provide the same
loving and doting care for Rebecca-their own biological child.
5. Propensity to Support Contact with the Other Parent
For the past three years, Conley and Johnson have been
cooperating regarding Conley's contact with Callie.7 1 Conley told
Barbara Walters of the ABC News show 20/20 that he takes Callie
everywhere he goes: "[I] [tlake her to car races. I take her to feed
my dogs. And everywhere I go, she is behind me."7 ' Although
Conley's and Johnson's relationship has been tumultuous, "they are
on good terms now."74 If things continue as they are, Johnson and
Conley would continue to encourage and support contact between
Rebecca and each other.
6. Child's Reasonable Preference
In custody disputes, one factor that courts may consider is a
child's wish to live with a particular parent.75 The probability that
a court will consider a child's preference rests primarily on her
age.76 If the child is younger than eight years old, her preference
69. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
70. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
71. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 64-65 (detailing Johnson's devotion to her family).
72. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
73. Id.
74. Cloud, supra note 6, at 65.
75. See T.K.T. v. F.P.T., 716 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (stating that a child's
preference will be considered in determining the child's best interests); Guardianship of
Sydney Simpson, 67 Cal. App. 4th 914, 940 n.22 (1998) (noting that a ten-year-old's and a
thirteen-year-old's preferences should be considered); Keller v. Keller, 584 N.W.2d 509, 513
(N.D. 1998) (stating that a fourteen-year-old's preference should be considered); Haase v.
Haase, 460 S.E. 585, 589 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that although the child's wish was not
controlling, it may be considered and given weight). But see Bigelow v. Bigelow, 959 S.W.2d
897, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the child's preference is not dispositive in a custody
dispute).
76. See Kathleen Nemechek, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions: Where We
Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV. 437, 446-51 (1998)
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may not be considered at all, or will be given very little weight." If
the child is twelve years old, however, her preference may be given
considerable weight.78 If she is fourteen years old or older, she will
be placed with the parent she chooses unless that parent is unfit.79
If she chooses, the judge may ascertain the child's preference for
living with a particular parent by interviewing the child in cham-
bers.80 The child's preference then is balanced with other factors
including her maturity," educational level, 2 intellectual and
emotional development,83 hostility toward one parent," the
advisability of recognizing a teenager's wishes,85 and whether a
young child recounts persuasive reasons for her choice.8 By these
(providing examples of four states where age is a factor in weighing a child's custody
preference); D.W. O'Neill, Annotation, Child Wishes as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4
A.L.R.3d 1396, 1416 (1965 & Supp. 1999) (giving instances when age of the child was a
factor).
77. See Gresser v. Glynn, 73 N.E.2d 671, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947).
78. See Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986).
79. See Tompkins v. Tompkins, 961 P.2d 419, 423-24 (Alaska 1998); Green v. Kelly, 712
So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Roehrdantz v. Roehrdantz, 438 N.W.2d 687, 691
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Bailes, 340 S.E.2d at 827; Paige K.B. v. Molepske, 580 N.W.2d 289,
295 (Wis. 1998); Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Wyo. 1997).
80. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/6043(2) (1998) (authorizing a court in its discretion to
interview a child in chambers in the presence of counsel and a reporter); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.
124.3 (Michie 1998) (permitting a court to ascertain "the reasonable preference of the child,
if the court deems the child to be of reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and
experience to express such a preference"); In re Marriage of Doty, 629 N.E.2d 679, 682-84 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to exercise court's discretion to examine a child); Haase, 460 S.E.2d
at 589 (electing to interview a child in chambers as "the preferred method" in most
jurisdictions).
81. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3)(f) (West 1997) (stating that the court shall
consider an articulated preference based on "consideration [ofl the child's age and maturity").
.82. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Blume, 473 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (citing
education level of child as factor in giving weight to her articulated custody preference).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Sage v. Sage, 28 A. 863, 865 (Pa. 1894) (finding
"where the child is of sufficient intelligence, its preferences and attachments should be
consulted before the question of its custody is determined"). But see Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384
N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that although children over eight years old
could express a custody preference, the trial court was proper in disregarding it because "the
children were in such a confused and anxious state" that such a conversation "would be
fruitless").
84. See Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wyo. 1985) (listing hostility toward non-
preferred parent as one factor).
85. See O'Neill, supra note 76, at 1426 ("[Mental capacity, and not age, [is] the
criterion.. ").
86. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 576 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Neb. 1998) (finding that when
a young child gives sound reasons for custody choice, it can be a factor in custody award);
Alvarez v. Carlson, 524 N.W.2d 584, 589, 592 (N.D. 1994) (stating that an intelligent choice
articulated by a mature child is a weighted factor in custody decision); In re Marriage of Moe,
676 P.2d 336, 338 (Or. 1984) (listing the child's reasons for wanting to live with her father);
Haase v. Haase, 460 S.E.2d 585, 589 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the court may examine
the child, in camera, to decide whether the child has "reasonable intelligence, understanding,
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standards, Rebecca's wishes will not be given any weight because
she is only four years old. Even if she were capable of verbalizing
her preference, she is too young for a court to credit her testimony.
7. Family Abuse
There is a history of discord between Johnson and Conley.
More specifically, there is evidence of repeated domestic violence.87
Relatives proclaimed that Carlton Conley was a doting father, but
court records tell a more chilling story about his relationship with
Johnson. In 1997, he served a four-day jail sentence for criminally
assaulting and battering Johnson." In January 1998, Johnson
accused Conley of assaulting her again and restraining her at
gunpoint.8 9 According to Johnson, Conley has pushed, shoved,
threatened to shoot her, and intentionally hit her car with his
truck.90 As a result, in April 1998, a court convicted him of assault
and battery.9 He had another court date set for September 1998
for the adjudication of another assault charge when news of the
switch became public.92 Johnson obtained two restraining orders
and a permit to carry a concealed weapon to protect herself from
Conley's physical attacks.93
Domestic violence is a factor that should be and is considered
in making custody and visitation decisions.9' There is no indication
age and experience to express" a custody preference); see also O'Neill, supra note 76, at 1426-
31 (providing examples of when a child's age was taken into account in deciding the child's
custody preference).
87. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
88. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
89. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27 (stating that Johnson did not intend to
drop the assault charges); Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
93. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(8) (Michie 1998) (making "history of family abuse"
admissible in custody determinations). For other examples of state statutes admitting abuse
evidence in custody disputes, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(4)-(7) (Michie 1998); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 11(c) (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4c (West 1993 & Supp. 1999);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1Xj) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191 (2)(a)(iii) (West
1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)(i) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). For cases admitting
domestic abuse evidence in custody proceedings, see Guardianship of Sydney Simpson, 67
Cal. App. 4th 914, 940 (1998); In re Heather, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Knock
v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 273-74 (Conn. 1993); In re Irwin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997); In re J.D. v. N.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d 468, 468 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996); Mary
Ann P. v. William R.P., Jr., 475 S.E.2d 1, 7-8 (W. Va. 1996); Henry v. Johnson, 450 S.E.2d
779, 783 (W. Va. 1994). For analysis of current statutes and recommendations for courts, see
Family Violence Project, Nat'l Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges, Family Violence
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that Conley has abused Callie Marie or Rebecca although he has
abused Johnson on more than one occasion. Domestic violence
affects children even when they are not directly or physically
harmed.95 Children who are not victimized by the abuser suffer
residual effects when there is violence in their home.96
"Children exposed to abuse are more insecure, more aggressive,
and more prone to depression. Children in this situation commonly
feel divided loyalties between their mothers and fathers. Research
shows that childhood exposure to wife abuse is a significant
predictor of future wife abuse."97 Placing a child in the custody of
a parent who batters the other parent is detrimental to the child's
safety and well-being. 9 For these reasons, a court may be reticent
about placing Rebecca with Conley unless it is assured that she will
be safe when she is in his care.
8. Other Factors: The Effect on the Child
"Other factors" is a catchall provision in the list of factors that
courts should consider in making custody determinations. Obvi-
ously, in light of this provision, a court would consider the extenuat-
ing circumstances in this particular matter. One such extenuating
circumstance may be the effect of the custody decision on the child.
Spirited debates have erupted about the potential problems or
detrimental effects that transferring custody of either of these girls
will have on them.9 Under other circumstances in which a parent
sought to regain custody from a non-parent, one court defined
detriment as "circumstances that produce or are likely to produce
lasting mental, physical, or emotional harm."1 °0 Another court
further explained that detriment is "more than the normal trauma
in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197,
225-27 (1995); Family Violence Project, Nat'l Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges,
Family Violence: Improving Court Practice, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., No. 4 1990, at 19-20.
95. See David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge,
BOSTON B.J., July/Aug. 1989, at 23, 24 (citations omitted).
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss,
JUDGES' J., Spring 1988, at 8, 12; Carla Garrity,& Mitchell A. Bars, Custody and Visitation:
Is It Safe? FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1995, at 40,42-43; Khachaturian, supra note 58, at 1757-58;
Lenore E. Walker & Glenace E. Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation
and Custody in Divorce, in DOMEsTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 127, 133-38 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed.,
1987).
99. See Mabry, supra note 13.
100. In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citation
omitted).
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caused to a child by uprooting him from familiar surroundings such
as often occurs by reason of divorce, death of a parent, or adoption.
It contemplates a longer term adverse effect that transcends the
normal adjustment period in such cases."I '
Naturally, the maintenance of stability in a child's life is a
paramount concern.0 2 A few courts have decided, however, that a
child who is six years old or younger should be placed in the custody
of her biological parent when she has lived with a third party for
less than four years.'0 3 The courts have emphasized three prerequi-
sites for biological parents to take custody of a young child who has
lived with a non-parent for an extended period: the biological
parent must be fit, the parent must have maintained a relationship
with the child, and a change of custody must be in the child's best
interest. "Even in light of these qualifications, however, the courts
place substantial weight on a fit biological parent's fundamental
right to custody.'0 5
When ordering a transfer of custody from a non-parent to a
parent, courts have rejected arguments that the child should
remain in the non-parent's home simply because the child already
had lived there for a long, uninterrupted period of time.I' 6 A change
101. Filter v. Bennett, 554 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
102. See Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516, 523 (Mass. 1998), cert. denied, Hugo P. v.
George P., 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999).
103. See Syphrit v. Turner, 446 So. 2d 626, 629-30 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (deciding that a
parent has primary right to custody over a non-parent); Evans v. Santoro, 507 A.2d 1007,
1011 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986) (determining that the financial status of a non-parent is not
enough to overcome a parent's primary right to custody); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW.,
460 So. 2d 368, 369-70 (Fla. 1984) (noting that the right to custody of one's offspring predates
common law); Bordley v. Blake, 478 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (sending a child
who lived with grandparents for two years back to natural father); cf Matzen, 600 So. 2d at
490 (transferring custody to parent after children had lived with their grandparents for six
years); Hoy v. Wills, 398 A.2d 109, 114-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (denying biological
mother's petition for change of custody after leaving child with his aunt for six years); Bailes
v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986) (granting custody to a stepmother who had reared
the child for ten years).
104. See Syphrit, 446 So. 2d at 629-30 (determining a change of custody based on these
three factors); see also Evans, 507 A.2d at 1011 (noting the three prerequisites before
transferring custody); D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d at 369-70 (noting that when both parents are
fit and have equal rights to custody, the only consideration left is what would be in the best
interests of the child).
105. See, e.g., D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d at 370 (noting that where custody is between a
natural parent and a third person, the test is weighed in favor of the natural parent and is
rebutted only if custody with the natural parent would be detrimental to the welfare of the
child).
106. See Syphrit, 446 So. 2d at 628 (granting custody to natural father even though child
lived with grandparents for three years); D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d at 369-70 (rejecting
argument that custody should be granted to grandparents who had cared for child since its
birth).'
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of custody has been ordered despite the child's strong attachment
to the non-parent. 10 7 Not unsympathetic, courts have noted that in
these situations, a child is likely to suffer some psychological
trauma as a result of the transfer to her biological parent's home.' 8
Still, the courts have ruled that "an early change would be less
traumatic than one ordered after the children had become older and
possibly less adaptable to change.""° Based upon this precedent, in
a court, the presumption that Rebecca should be placed with her
biological parents most likely would prevail.
Johnson made contact with the Chittums and the Rogerses
immediately after she learned that her child was living with
them."0 She has visited Rebecca,"' and she has been concerned
about Rebecca's well-being." 2 More important, the reason that she
did not have contact with Rebecca for three years was because she
did not know that Rebecca was her daughter. Moreover, although
Rebecca has been separated from her mother for three years, she
has lived with her grandparents for only a few months."3 After
Rogers and Chittum died, their families endeavored to rear Rebecca
together. 114 They have an alternating shared custody arrangement
that allows one set of grandparents to have custody of Rebecca for
four months." 5 During the first rotation, she lived with the Rogers
family-and that is where Johnson found her.""
In the beginning, Johnson decided that all she wanted was to
visit her biological child. 117 She did not intend, she said, to wrest
Rebecca from the only family she knew." 8 As Rebecca's biological
107. See Evans, 507 A.2d at 1011 (acknowledging the experts' assessment of a strong bond
between the child and her grandparents).
108. See id; see also In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1258 (N.J. 1999)
(terminating a biological mother's parental rights while recognizing the trauma of removing
a child from her long-term home).
109. Meinking v. Meinking, 529 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Mo. 1975) (changing custody froni
grandparents to father); cf. Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827-28 (Va. 1986) (declining to
change custody based on a twelve-year-old's preference to be with her stepmother and a
psychologist's conclusion that a transfer of custody would have a "significant, harmful, long-
term impact").
110. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 64; Jones & Shear, supra note 14.





116. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 64 (noting that the grandparents had set up a rotation
schedule to care for Rebecca); Jones & Shear, supra note 14 (reporting that a U. Va. medical
team found Rebecca at Linda Rogers's home).
117. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
118. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
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parent, however, Johnson is entitled to custody of Rebecca. 19 She
has a fundamental right to rear her own child, to make decisions
about her education, religious upbringing, and her general
welfare.12 Therefore, in a court of law, it is very likely Johnson
would receive custody of Rebecca. If necessary, she could file a
habeas corpus petition to regain custody of Rebecca from the
grandparents.
In May 1999, Johnson filed a lawsuit against the Common-
wealth of Virginia and Medical Center officials, doctors, and
nurses.'2 ' Among other claims, Johnson properly alleged that those
defendants deprived her of her constitutional right to rear
Rebecca.
22
B. Conley's Rights as an Unwed Father
Carlton Conley was Johnson's boyfriend when Rebecca was
born.123 From the beginning, Johnson and Conley assumed that the
child that Johnson gave birth to in June 1995 was Conley's child.1
24
After Conley contested parentage, however, the court ordered
paternity tests. 125 DNA test results proved that there is a 99.94%
probability that Conley is Rebecca's biological father.2 6 Conley does
not live with Johnson and does not intend to live with her in the
future. 127  Nevertheless, as Rebecca's father, he has cognizable
rights. 128
119. See Sobin v. Department of Human Dev., No. 153340, 1997 WL 1070632, at *1 (Va.
Cir. Ct July 1, 1997).
120. See id.
121. See Michael D. Shear, Mother of Switched Baby Files Suit for $31 Million, WASH.
POST, May 25, 1999, at B1.
122. See id. The Virginia Supreme Court refused to invalidate a settlement reached
between the grandparents and the Medical Center. Johnson unsuccessfully argued that the
settlement was invalid because the grandparents did not have a right to negotiate with state
officials as they are not biologically related to Rebecca. See Supreme Court Refuses to Hear
Settlement Appeal, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Virginia), Sept. 11, 1999, at C5 [hereinafter
Supreme Court Refuses].
123. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
124. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
125. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
126. See Identity of Switched Baby's Father Confirmed, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1998, at D3.
127. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
128. See generally Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (finding that unwed fathers
who did not contribute child support or visit their children still have rights to custody of their
children, but less than that of divorced or separated fathers); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1973) (holding that the State was barred from taking custody of children from an unwed
father absent a hearing and finding that father was unfit; presumption of unfitness was a
violation of due process and equal protection); Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 292 N.E.2d 145 (Ill.
1972) (noting that an unwed father is not barred from obtaining custody of children).
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In the United States, both parents have equal rights under the
presumption that biological parents have a fundamental right to
rear their own children.12 Accordingly, single biological fathers
have a right to develop a relationship with their children."'0 They
have a right to custody, or, as non-custodial parents, they have a
right to visitation."' Once a relationship has been established, they
may have a right to grant or deny consent for their child's
adoption.'32 Virginia law also requires that both parents have
frequent and continuous contact with the child and must share
child-rearing responsibilities. 3 Thus, Conley may have the right
to custody of or visitation with Rebecca, to develop a relationship
with her, and to contest her adoption.
To fulfill the statutory mandate of making placement decisions
with the child's best interest in mind, Johnson probably would
receive custody of Rebecca. She is her biological mother. There is
no indication that she is unfit. 3 ' She has provided adequate care
for her other children and for Callie.'35 Conley's history of domestic
violence probably would be a hindrance to his ability to obtain
custody of Rebecca. 3 ' As the non-custodial parent, however, it is
likely that he would have visitation rights.
C. Exceptions to the Biological Parents' Right to Custody
The fundamental right to raise one's child is not absolute, and
the presumption that a biological parent has a right to custody is
rebuttable.'37 States describe the presumption in different ways.
In Virginia, for example, in custody cases between a parent and a
non-parent, the law presumes that the child's best interest will be
129. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); accord Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 747 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); In re D.A.McW. v. McWhite, 460 So. 2d 368, 369
(Fla. 1984); Brauch v. Shaw, 432 A.2d 1, 5 (N.H. 1981).
130. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260-61 (1983).
131. See Vanderlaan, 292 N.E.2d at 146.
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 (1998); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Stanley, 405 U.S. at
651-52; Pi v. Delta, 400 A.2d 709, 711-12 (Conn. 1978); Vanderlaan, 292 N.E.2d at 146;
Sparks v. Phelps, 540 P.2d 397, 398 (Or. 1975).
133. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 1998).
134. See generally 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Cloud, supra note 6.
135. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 63-64.
136. See, e.g., Gomez v. Savage, 580 N.W.2d 523, 534 (Neb. 1998) (finding that father's
recent improvements did not mitigate past criminal conduct and neglect of children).
137. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982); see also In re Guardianship of
K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1251 (N.J. 1999) (finding the constitutional protection of family rights
tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect a child's welfare).
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served when the child is in the parent's custody. 138 Yet, the child's
best interests still are paramount when the dispute is between a
parent and a non-parent.139 A court may determine that placement
with a non-parent would be in the child's best interest when there
is clear and convincing evidence that: "(1) the parents are unfit; (2)
a court previously has granted an order of divestiture; (3) the
parents voluntarily relinquished custody; (4) the parents abandoned
the child; or (5) special facts and circumstances constitute extraor-
dinary reasons to take the child from the parents."40
Obviously, an unfit parent may not rear her child. Unfitness
may refer either to the parent's unwillingness or inability to
properly care for the child.44 Also, a biological parent may forfeit
her right to rear her own child when there is clear and convincing
evidence that the parent abused, abandoned, or neglected the child,
misused alcohol or drugs, or had mental or physical disabilities that
rendered her incapable of caring for the child. 142
138. See Elder v. Evans, 427 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Va. 1993).
139. See id. at 748.
140. Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 244 (Va. 1989); see also Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457
S.E.2d 102, 104 (Va. 1995) (finding "clear and convincing" as standard for awarding custody
to non-parent and only when parent has been determined to be unfit including parent's
misconduct that affects child, neglect of child, demonstrated unwillingness and inability to
promote emotional and physical well-being of child, nature of home environment, and moral
climate in which child is to be raised); Smith v. Pond, 360 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Va. 1987) (finding
the best interests of the child not served through parental custody only when the non-parent
adduces clear and convincing evidence that parents are unfit, the court previously has
granted order of divestiture, parents voluntarily relinquished custody, parents abandoned
child, or special facts and circumstances constitute extraordinary reason to take child from
parents).
141. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie 1995) (stating that the court may award
custody to a third party if evidence proves that it would be in the child's best interests);
Williams v. Williams, 922 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the presumption
that it is in the best interest of minor child to have parent appointed conservator and
guardian, but it may be overcome by evidence that parent is unfit or incompetent to take
charge of child); Gomez v. Savage, 580 N.W.2d 523, 533 (Neb. 1998) (listing reasons for
finding a parent unfit); Uhing v. Uhing, 488 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Neb. 1992) (defining unfitness
as "a personal deficiency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably prevent,
performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which has caused, or
probably will result in, detriment to a child's well-being"); Raynor v. Odom, 478 S.E.2d 655,
661 (N.C. 1996) (awarding custody to grandmother because mother was unfit); Hickman v.
Futty, 489 S.E.2d 232, 238 (Va. 1997) (finding that the mother was unable or unwilling to
care for her daughter and granting grandparent's petition to adopt); Winfield v. Urquhart,
492 S.E.2d 464,468-69 (Va. 1997) (finding father who murdered the children's mother unfit);
Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827-28 (Va. 1986) (awarding custody to stepmother over
mother's objection); Forbes v. Hancy, 133 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Va. 1963) (awarding custody to
grandmother); Richardson v. Richardson, 415 S.E.2d 276, 278-79 (W. Va. 1992) (defining
fitness).
142. See, e.g., R.F. v. S.S., 928 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Alaska 1996) (terminating father's
parental rights involuntarily when the father had been convicted of murdering mother but
had not exhausted his appeals, given that the child had special medical needs and maternal
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At this point, Johnson's unfitness has not been demonstrated,
but her right to rear Rebecca may be challenged on two grounds.
First, Johnson has a criminal record too, albeit a short one. In
1994, Johnson admitted to abusing and cursing a teacher-a
misdemeanor in Virginia." Apparently, the teacher spun gravel on
Johnson's twelve-year-old son, Wesley, after the teacher drove
Wesley home. This act angered Johnson, and she cursed the
teacher as she ran after the teacher's car.1" Johnson, who says she
was only protecting her son, was placed on probation.
45
Even though Johnson pled guilty to this crime, there is no
evidence that she is an unfit mother. That five-year-old misde-
meanor offense alone is not enough for a court to deny Johnson the
right to rear Rebecca. "[Tihe fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their
children does not evaporate simply because they have not been
model parents."46
The second challenge to Johnson's ability to rear Rebecca may
be based on her economic status. Johnson is a flagger for a
construction company with a monthly salary of $1000.147 Someone
who is contesting Johnson's right to rear Rebecca may contend that
grandparents wished to adopt and could provide a permanent environment for such care);
In re A.C., 507 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (terminating father's rights for reasons
of drug abuse and sexual and physical abuse of others in the household); Craven v. Doe, 915
P.2d 720, 724 (Idaho 1996); Gomez, 580 N.W.2d at 534 (terminating father's rights for failing
to provide child support, having a criminal record, and abusing alcohol and drugs); Bush v.
State, 929 P.2d 940, 941 (Nev. 1996) (terminating parental rights where parents were
mentally challenged); In re Guardianship of KH.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1254-55 (N.J. 1999)
(terminating a biological mother's parental rights due to persistent drug addiction); In re
Roselyn Mercedes F., 657 N.Y.S.2d 8, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (terminating rights of mentally
ill parent); Hickman, 489 S.E.2d at 238 (failing to establish a relationship with the child, to
visit her, or to attempt to regain custody); Winfield, 492 S.E.2d at 470 (concluding that "de
facto abandonment" had occurred); Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 107 (defining fitness); Patrick v.
Byerley, 325 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Va. 1985) (abandoning a child constitutes unfitness); Toombs
v. Lynchburg Div.'of Soc. Serva., 288 S.E.2d 405, 409 (Va. 1982) (finding that a father was
unwilling and unable to provide a suitable home and a mother who was mentally unstable).
143. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Cloud, supra note 6, at 65. The statute
that governs that crime provides that:
If any person shall, in the presence or hearing of another, curse or abuse such
other person, or use any violent abusive language to such person concerning
himself or any of his relations, or otherwise use such language, under
circumstances reasonably calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, he-shall
be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-416 (Michie 1998).
144. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 65.
145. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
146. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
147. See Blum & Shear, supra note 38; Cloud, supra note 6, at 63-64.
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the grandparents could offer Rebecca a better lifestyle. 148 On the
contrary, it is well established that custody determinations may not
be made based on a parent's socioeconomic status or a conclusion
that someone else may provide a better home for the child. 49 The
fact that a non-parent may be able to offer more material advan-
tages in life for the child is not determinative. 150 The equalizer is
child support. "[Tihe purpose of child support awards is to ensure
that the [parent] otherwise best fit for custody receives adequate
funds for the support of the child."1 51
There is very little precedent regarding how a court should
resolve a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent when
a baby switch has occurred. A similar case involving two female
infants was litigated in a Florida court.152 At Hardee Memorial
Hospital in Florida, Barbara Mays and Regina Twigg gave birth to
their baby girls on or about the same day in 1978.153 When the
Twigg child was tested ten years later, the Twiggs learned that the
child they had named Arlena Beatrice was not their biological
child. 5 4 When they received this information, Arlena was very ill
with a congenital heart condition.155 Later, she succumbed to her
illness and died. 156
Kimberly Mays was the only other white female child born at
Hardee Memorial around the same time as Arlena.' 57 The parties
stipulated that they would submit to Human Leukocyte Antigen
blood testing.15 8 The test results showed that the probability that
Kimberly was the Twiggs' daughter was greater than 95%. 159 After
an intense, five-year custody battle, the judge decided, however,
148. There is no indication that money is a factor in the grandparents' threats of filing suit
for Rebecca or Callie, apart from the general allegations that Johnson is an unfit mother.
See Michael D. Shear, Settlement Approved for Family in Baby Swap, WASH. POST, April 6,
1999, at BI.
149. See Cooper v. Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 300 (1993); In re Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 489-
90 (Fla. 1992); Scott v. Steelman, 953 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Mo. 1997); Gomez v. Savage, 580
N.W.2d 523, 533-34 (Neb. 1998); Raynor v. Odom, 478 S.E.2d 655, 659 (N.C. 1996).
150. See Raynor, 478 S.E.2d at 659.
151. Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986). The court further explained that
"comparative income or economic advantage is not a permissible basis for a custody award."
Id. at 491.
152. See Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-
4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993).





158. See Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at *1. See also supra note 36 for an explanation of
different methods of establishing paternity.
159. See id. at *2.
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that a legal determination that the Twiggs were Kimberly's
biological parents would be too detrimental to Kimberly. 60 "The
effect of this ruling is that the [Twiggs] have no legal interest in or
right to Kimberly Mays; that Robert Mays' legal status as the
father of Kimberly Mays remains unchanged .... .1 1
The outcome for Callie Marie and Rebecca would not be the
same as the outcome in the Twigg/Mays baby switch controversy.
Kimberly spent ten years with the Mays family,162 a much longer
period than Rebecca has been separated from her biological family.
Kimberly believed that the Mays were her biological parents, and
she established a strong psychological bond with them.'6 By
comparison, because Rogers and Chittum, the adults who reared
Rebecca for three years, died, Rebecca has not been with the wrong
family for a significant amount of time. Admittedly, there will be
some trauma if Rebecca is removed from the Chittum and Rogers
families-the people with whom she has lived and bonded, on some
level, for several months. In addition, as grandparents, the
Chittums and Rogerses have had some contact with Rebecca for
years.
Johnson has said that it would be unfair to take Rebecca out of
the only home she has known and to move her to Ruckersville with
four other children who are strangers to her.1 64 In agreement,
Brenda Rogers, Callie's step-grandmother, said, "[p] eople think that
you can just turn your love off and turn a child over that you've had
for three years. You can't do that. You cannot take a child that you
have had for three years and say, 'we don't want her anymore'...
"165 This statement does not appear to reflect true consideration for
Rebecca's best interests. It reflects more concern for how the adults
will feel than it does for the effect that this switch will have on
Rebecca.
If another switch is made, one way of minimizing disruption in
the girls' lives is to gradually introduce them to their new families.
The children have met the other family members.6 6 Gradual and
phased-in visits would help each girl to become familiar with her
new surroundings and the people who live there. It is true that
Rebecca and Callie probably will be traumatized upon removal from
160. See id.
161. Id. at *6.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
165. 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
166. See 20/20: Switched at Birth 2, supra note 62.
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their current homes. In the long term, however, more damage may
be done if they are not transferred.
IV. PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS
Just as biological parents have parental rights, they have
obligations to their children. All states, for example, require that
children attend school. 6 7 In addition, states require parents to
provide necessary and proper care for their children including food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care."'8
A. Child Support
One obligation parents share is their equal responsibility in
providing monetary support for their children's general mainte-
nance and education.169 The policy underlying child support
payments is that they are "exclusively for the benefit and economic
best interest of the child." 70 In addition, the non-custodial parent
may be expected to provide medical and dental insurance, 7' health
care, 72 and life insurance. 17' The support obligation begins when
167. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (Michie 1999). For a discussion on the
development of compulsory education laws, see R. FREEMAN BUTTS, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN
THE UNITED STATES FROM REVOLUTION TO REFORM 102-03 (1978).
168. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08.1-01 (1997) (making parents "legally responsible"
for the physical and educational maintenance of their children); see also infra notes 169-74
and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 26.27.065 (Michie 1999) (making the custodial parent
responsible for ensuring payment); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-501(A) (West 1999) (ordering
reasonable support for minor, unemancipated children); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3900 (West 1999)
(giving mother and father "equal responsibility to support their minor children"); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 110-128 (1999) (drafting legislation to ensure payment of support); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2919.21(AX2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (stating that parents must provide for their
able-bodied children below the age of 18 and their handicapped children below the age of 21);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250. 1(A) (Michie 1995) (authorizing the Department of Social Services
to order child support payments). For examples of cases mandating child support payments,
see Lo Porto v. Lo Porto, 717 So. 2d 418, 421 (Ala. 1998); Alaska ex rel. Hawthorne v. Rios,
938 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Alaska 1997); Baggett v. Baggett, 693 So. 2d 264, 269 (La. 1997); Carole
I. v. Arnold K, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593, 597 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1976); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 472
S.E.2d 668, 672 (Va. 1996); see also JUDITH CASSETTY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY
5-14 (1978) (chronicling the history of the support obligation).
170. Carter v. Carter, 479 S.E.2d 681, 686 (W. Va. 1996); accord Dillard v. Dillard, 727
P.2d 71, 76 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); Commonwealth Dep't of Soc. Serve. v. Hogge, 431 S.E.2d 656, 657 (Va. 1993);
Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1985).
171. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(D) (Michie 1995) (ordering the payment of
"extraordinary mental and dental expenses" by the non-custodial parent).
172. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-250, 20.108.1(C) (Michie 1998).
173. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20.108.1(D) (Michie 1998).
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the child is born and continues until the child becomes emanci-
pated, reaches the age of majority, marries, or dies. 74 As Rebecca's
biological parents, both Johnson and Conley have a legal obligation
to provide monetary support for her general maintenance.
A Virginia judge properly ruled that because Callie is not
Conley's daughter, Conley is not legally obligated to support her.175
On the other hand, Conley may not be able to recover reimburse-
ment for any amount he already paid. 176 Although Conley does not
have a legal obligation to support Callie, as Rebecca's biological
father, he does have a legal obligation to provide support for
Rebecca. The amount he would have to pay would be calculated by
using a statutory guideline. In Virginia, and in the majority of
states, a guideline called the Income Shares Model is used to
determine the amount of child support.177
B. Tax Consequences
Child support and payment of federal income taxes are linked.
Thus identifying Rebecca's custodial parent is also important in
determining federal tax obligations. Under the Internal Revenue
174. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (West 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-278.15,
20.124.2(C) (Michie 1998); Hawthorne, 938 P.2d at 1015 (finding that an obligation exists
even when the father is unaware of the child's birth). For cases in which parents may have
an ongoing support obligation when the adult child is disabled or the parent agrees to pay
college expenses, see Kiken v. Kiken, 694 A.2d 557, 562-63 (N.J. 1997); Cohn v. Cohn, 934
P.2d 279, 280 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
175. "I can't order child support from people who aren't parents," the Judge ruled. David
Reed, Mom of Switched Baby Gets Custody, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 22, 1998, available in
1998 WL 6726861; see also N.P.A. v. W.B.A., 380 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. 1989) (stating that,
absent special circumstances, a non-parent will not be legally obligated to support a child).
176. See Evink v. Pekin Ins. Co., 460 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. 1984) (denying
reimbursement without a parent's express or implied promise to repay a third party);
Samuelson v. Samuelson, 644 N.Y.S.2d 232, 232-33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (denying
reimbursement for failure to show expectation of reimbursement or make a demand for
reimbursement within a reasonable time).
177. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1-2 (Michie 1998); accord ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-320
(West 1999); W. VA. CODE § 48A-1B-1(d) (1998); see also Jenkins v. Jenkins, 704 A.2d 231,
235-36 (Conn. 1998) (explaining the principles of the guidelines and using them to calculate
child support payments); Homsher v. Homsher, 678 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ind. 1997) (defining
the guideline); Drummond v. Drummond, 714 A.2d 163, 172 (Md. 1998) (recognizing the
method in Maryland); Bast v. Rossoff, 635 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(explaining how the calculation is done); Fink v. Fink, 462 S.E.2d 844, 853 (N.C. 1995) (using
the guidelines to determine amount of child support); Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1197
(Pa. 1994) (discussing principles of guidelines and the implementation of the practice);
Donnelly v. Donnelly, No. 146187, 1998 WL 972128, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 1998) (using
the formula to calculate the child support amount). But see Robertson v. Robertson, No.
03A01-9711-CV-00511, 1998 WL 783339, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1998) (stating that the
Income Shares Model had not been adopted in Tennessee).
24 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
Code, the custodial parent-the parent who has custody for the
majority of the tax year-is entitled to a child dependency tax
exemption.17 The custodial parent is entitled to the exemption
even if the non-custodial parent provides more than half of the
monetary support for the child.179 The custodial parent, however,
may relinquish that entitlement to the non-custodial parent. °80 To
transfer entitlement, the custodial parent must file a written
declaration with the IRS. 8' Thus, if Johnson receives custody of
Rebecca, she would be entitled to claim the exemption. She could,
however, waive her right and transfer the exemption to Conley.'82
V. PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENTS
Joseph Goldstein coined the phrase "psychological parents."83
These are persons who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through
"interaction, companionship, and shared experiences," fulfill a
child's psychological needs.' No blood relationship to the child is
required." 5 This theory focuses on the emotional bond that exists
between the child and the adults in her life.18 6 By definition, any
caring person with a relationship with the child, regardless of
whether that person is a biological parent, could be adjudged a
psychological parent. 187 Furthermore, psychologists have deduced
that "so far as the child's emotions are concerned, interference with
the tie, whether to a 'fit' or 'unfit' psychological parent, is extremely
painful. ," 88
178. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(1)(A) (1998).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See § 152(e)(2) (Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated
Parents on Form 8332); see also Flanagan v. Flanagan, 656 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995) (assuming that the custodial parent will take the exemption, but allowing the court,
in its discretion, to award the exemption to the non-custodial parent); Dahlberg v. Dahlberg,
358 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. 1984) (refusing to address the issue in a divorce proceeding but
referring the parties to tax laws).
182. See § 152(e)(2).
183. JOSEPH GoLDsTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 12 (1996).
184. Id.
185. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1976).
186. See GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 183, at 12-13.
187. See id.; see also In re Thaddeus, (no docket number in original), 1998 WL 779548, at
*6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1998) (finding that the foster parent who had cared for the child
for two years was the psychological parent); Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL
330624, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993) (declaring that Robert Mays who reared Kimberly
for ten years was her psychological parent); Hickman v. Futty, 489 S.E.2d 232, 233 (Va. Ct.
App. 1997) (describing a child's adaptation to a prospective adoptive family's home).
188. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 12.
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In a Maryland court, a judge announced criteria that may be
used to determine whether a child should be placed with a non-
parent who has cared for the child for an extended period:
The factors which... may be of probative value in determining
the existence of exceptional circumstances include the length of
time the child has been away from the biological parent, the age
of the child when care was assumed by the third party, the
possible emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, the
period of time which elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim
the child, the nature and strength of ties between the child and
the third party custodian, the intensity and genuineness of the
parent's desire to have the child, the stability and certainty as
to the child's future in the custody of the parent.... The child
may be so long in the custody of the non-parent that, even
though there has been no abandonment or persistent neglect by
the parent, the psychological trauma of removal is grave enough
to be detrimental to the best interest of the child. The court
may consider whether the child is in the present custody of the
parent or non-parent. "Changes in conditions which affect the
relative desirability of custodians, even when the contest is
between two natural parents, are not to be accorded significance
unless the advantages of changing custody outweigh the
essential principle of continued and stable custody of
children."189
One author advocates that when non-parents have developed a relation-
ship with a child because of a baby switch, the psychological parent should
be treated as an equitable adoptive parent."m Such treatment would place
the psychological parent on equal footing with the biological parent:
In a mistaken baby switch situation, the legal system confronts
the child with the fact that his or her "parents" are not really
related to the child at all, thus crumbling the world as it stood
for the child. Moreover, the possibility that the biological
parents could assert an absolute right to custody would allow
infliction of serious, possibly permanent, psychological harm to
the child.
The alternative to this is to give the psychological parent,
when appropriate, the status of an equitably adoptive parent.
In effect, the child then has two sets of parents, biological and
psychological. Each parent has equal rights to seek custody and
189. Ross v. Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582, 593-94 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (citations omitted)
(quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1976)).
190. See Baunach, supra note 52, at 512.
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visitation. Putting them on equal footing allows the court to
bypass all of the parental rights problems and go straight to the
issue: the best interests of the child.
In determining the existence of an equitable adoption, a
court should apply a Singer test of clear, cogent and convincing
evidence. The court should consider, among other things, the
love and affection between the parent and child, the length of
the relationship, and reliance by the child on the existence of
this parent-child relation.... [Tihe equitable nature of custody
proceedings demand that the court place paramount importance
on the child's best interests, even if that includes giving a third
party the status of a parent. 191
Undeniably, Johnson is Callie Marie's psychological parent.
Continuously, she has been Callie Marie's primary caretaker for
more than three years, and Callie is thriving in Johnson's home.1 92
She is treated as a member of Johnson's family in the only home
that she has ever known. 193
Conley also may have psychological parent status. When asked
who her father is, in the breathy voice of a young toddler, Callie
Marie responded, "Carlton Conley." 94 Conley, who appears to
spend a significant amount of time with Callie, at the races and
doing chores,'95 intimated his future plans "to be out there [for both
girls] as long as they live."' 9 Consequently, he may be Callie's
psychological parent, too. Due to Conley's bond with Callie, he
should be entitled to visitation rights with the same potential
restrictions that could limit his visitation with Rebecca. 1
97
As Callie's biological parents are deceased and Johnson has
been the primary caregiver for her, there is a high probability that
Johnson would receive custody of Callie. A judge already has
placed Callie in Johnson's legal custody.' 9 On September 21, 1998,
Judge Frank Somerville decided that Johnson should retain custody
191. Id. at 512-13 (footnotes omitted) (citing Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987) and Singer v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978)).





197. See, e.g., In re Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (granting "liberal
and reasonable visitation" to grandparents who had cared for their grandchildren for six
years); In re Slayton, 685 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Ill. 1997) (granting visitation rights to the
psychological parent); In re Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893, 912 (W. Va. 1998) (awarding
visitation to those who have a "parent-like relationship with the child").
198. See Reed, supra note 175.
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of Callie, in part because "nobody else has come forward." 9' He
then added that Callie's biological grandparents (the Rogerses and
the Chittums) could petition for custody later. 00
The Rogerses and the Chittums are Callie's biological grand-
parents.201 In Virginia, grandparents are deemed to have a
legitimate interest in their grandchildren's well-being.0 2 A court
may award custody to anyone, including grandparents, "with a
legitimate interest" in the child's custody.03 Thus, the Rogerses
and the Chittums have a statutory right to seek custody of Callie.
Because of the strong emotional bond between Callie and Johnson,
however, a court probably would determine that it would be in
Callie's best interest to remain in Johnson's custody.
With regard to Rebecca, the Rogerses and the Chittums may
contend that they stand in loco parentis.
The theory of in loco parentis, provides ... that ... one who
knowingly and voluntarily assumes the role of parent to a child
may obtain certain legally cognizable rights and obligations the
same as if between "a parent and child" but only so long as the
relationship which gave rise to the rights and duties continues
to exist.2 4
Considering the shared custody arrangement and the date of
Whitney Rogers's and Kevin Chittum's death, the Rogerses and
Chittums have had physical custody of Rebecca for only a few
months.20 5 Courts have not held that a child has to be in a psycho-
logical parent's custody for a minimum amount of time before the
psychological parent doctrine will be applicable.2 6 Yet, in light of
the case authority discussed above 207 and the fact that neither
Johnson nor Conley has relinquished rights over Rebecca, it is
highly unlikely that a court would award custody to Rebecca's
grandparents even if it finds that these third parties have a
legitimate interest in Rebecca.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See Cloud supra note 6, at 64; Two Families, supra note 60.
202. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15(B) (Michie 1998).
203. Id.
204. NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178, 180-81 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Doughty v.
Thornton, 145 S.E. 249, 251 (Va. 1928)).
205. See Family Authorizes, supra note 41.
206. Some statutes do require, however, that a child live with her adoptive family for a
trial period before the adoption may become final. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at
14.
207. See supra Part III.A.8.
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VI. VISITATION
A. Parental Rights
Shortly after discovery of the Johnson/Chittum switch, all of
the adults involved expressed their intent to leave the girls in place
and to work out liberal visitation plans.2"' There is a presumption
in favor of a non-custodial parent's right to visitation.0 9 Two
policies support that presumption. First, the non-custodial parent
has a right to love and to instruct the child and to become a
companion for the child.2 ' Second, visitation encourages mainte-
nance of a strong familial relationship between the child and both
parents.2 1'
Moreover, visitation usually benefits the child. The child has
a right to know, love, and respect both parents as well as to receive
both parents' love and guidance.212 Still, "[a] fundamental concept
208. See Shear, Baby's Identity, supra note 24 (vowing to agree on liberal visitation); Two
Families, supra note 60 (originally agreeing to let the families get together informally).
209. See People ex rel. Vallera v. Rivera, 351 N.E.2d 391, 393-94 (Ill. 1976); LeHew v.
Mellyn, 475 N.E.2d 913, 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.400(2) (West
1999) (restricting visitation only if there is proven physical or emotional danger to the child).
210. See White v. Williamson, 453 S.E.2d 666, 677 (W. Va. 1994).
211. See id.
212. See J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 413-14 (Alaska 1997) (finding that parents have a
right to "reasonable visitation" and that sharing parenting responsibilities is in the public's
best interest); In re Avery, 622 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ill. 1993) (finding orders of child support
and visitation independent of each other and for the primary benefit of the child; the
obligations cannot be joined); Appert v. Appert, 341 S.E.2d 342, 349 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(considering "best interests" of child in making visitation decisions as an important, natural
right of the parent); Sterbling v. Sterbling, 519 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (calling
the non-custodial parent's right to visitation a "natural right" which "should be denied only
under extraordinary circumstances"); Carter v. Carter, 479 S.E.2d 681, 687 (W. Va. 1996)
(noting that even nonpayment of child support should not suspend visitation rights as
purpose of visitation is to benefit the child); Weber v. Weber, 457 S.E.2d 488, 490-91 (W. Va.
1995) (recognizing "primary concern of ... the non-custodial parent's right to a close
relationship with his or her child"); White, 453 S.E.2d at 677 (reminding the courts to
"facilitat[e] the right of the non-custodial parent to a full and fair chance to continue to have
a relationship with his children").
Some psychologists do not recommend visitation:
Where courts impose visitation as a condition of custody, this may itself be
source of discontinuity. . . . [L]oyalty conflicts are common under such
conditions and may have devastating consequences by destroying the child's
positive relationships to both parents. A parent visiting against or without
regard to the wishes of the custodial parent has less chance of serving as a
constructive force in the life of her child. The non-custodial parent should have
no legally enforceable right to visit the child, and the custodial parent should
have the right to decide whether it is desirable for the child to have such visits.
GOLDSTEIN ETAL., supra note 183, at 23.
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in the public policy.., is that the best interest and welfare of the
children are paramount when deciding matters of visitation."213
Thus, the trial judge has broad discretion in determining the scope
and frequency of visitation. 214 The length of time that the judge
allows a non-parent or non-custodial parent to visit with the child
depends upon the child's age, the parties'jobs and other responsibil-
ities, and other factors relevant to the child's best interests.215
As with the presumption that biological parents should have
custody of their children, biological parents' right to visitation is not
absolute.216 Visitation should not be allowed, for instance, when a
non-custodial parent is unfit,217 visitation is not in the child's best
interest,218 or when visitation would seriously endanger the child's
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.219
On the other hand, even though a parent may be unfit, courts
are reluctant to completely curtail visitation between the parent
and the child.22° Visitation should not be denied unless extraordi-
nary circumstances exist.221 Instead, courts are more likely to
order supervised visitation or place other conditions on the parent's
visitation privileges.222 Supervised visitation requires a third
person's presence while the non-custodial parent spends time with
the child.22" The purpose of supervised visitation is to ensure the
safety of the child or the child's custodial parent.224
Thus, a court could order a pretrial social services investigation
to determine whether Conley should have unrestricted visitation.225
213. Carter, 479 S.E.2d at 686; accord DuBois v. DuBois, 714 So. 2d 308, 309 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1998); Auery, 622 N.E.2d at 1235; Appert, 341 S.E.2d at 349; Vissicchio v. Vissicchio, 498
S.E.2d 425, 431 (Va. 1998).
214. See Hubbard Hall v. Hubbard, 697 So. 2d 486, 490 (Ala. 1997); Watkins v. Watkins,
462 S.E.2d 687, 689 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Vissicchio, 498 S.E.2d at 431.




219. See J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 413-14 (Alaska 1996); Marriage of Sundberg, 946
P.2d 296, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
220. See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1258-59 (N.J. 1999) (finding that
where a positive, benign relationship had formed between a parent and the biological child,
visitation was to continue as in a case of"open adoption"--even after natural parent's rights
were severed).
221. See Minas v. Shevlin, 678 N.Y.S.2d 672, 672 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
222. See Robert B. Straus, Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 FAM. L.Q. 229,
230 (1995).
223. See id. at 229.
224. See id.
225. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-273 to 274 (Michie 1999); see also Khan v. Khan, 654
N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (ordering supervised visitation because of father's
history of abusing the children's mother).
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If Conley has difficulty in controlling his anger, supervised
visitation and counseling should be required if Callie's, Rebecca's,
or Johnson's safety or well-being may be threatened. Alternatively,
some other condition may be imposed.
Visitation was the compromise in the 1992 Paul baby switch
case.26 Jodie Denise Paul learned that her son had been switched
nine years ago and was living with adoptive parents.2 7 When Paul
challenged the custody arrangement, she was awarded visitation.22
Thus, as an alternative to custody of Rebecca, both Johnson and
Conley legally would be entitled to visitation with Rebecca.
B. Grandparents'Right o Visitation
In nearly all states, legislatures have enacted legislation that
allows grandparents to spend quality time with their
grandchildren.229 In most states, however, grandparent visitation
is restricted to particular circumstances that are designated in the
statute.23 ° Typically, grandparents may not even petition for
visitation unless their grandchild's parents are divorced, the
grandparent's child cannot be located, the grandchild has lived with
the grandparents for a significant length of time, or the grandpar-
ent's child is deceased.231 Some courts determine whether visitation
226. See Blum & Shear, supra note 38.
227. See id.
228. See id.; see also Hoy v. Wills, 398 A.2d 109, 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
(granting the natural mother visitation rights even after voluntarily placing child in care of
paternal aunt and aunt had become the "psychological parent").
229. See Gregory, supra note 46, at 370-71. But see Brunetti v. Saul, 724 So. 2d 142, 142
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional);
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 23 (declaring that "grandparents ought not to have a
legally enforceable right to visit"). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, GRANDPARENT
VISITATION DISPUTES: A LEGAL RESOURCE MANUAL (Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp eds., 1989)
(discussing grandparents' rights); Sandra Joan Morris, Grandparents, Uncles, Aunts,
Cousins, Friends: How Is the Court to Decide Which Relationships Will Continue? 12 FAM.
ADVOC. 10 (1989) (discussing logistical problems with third-party visitation and listing state
statutes).
230. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25409(A) (West Supp. 1998);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(a) (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1999); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 752.01 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1998); 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
5/607(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.022(1) (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West Supp. 1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-9-102(1)-(2) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(1)-(2) (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-9-2 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bl) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1
(Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.121 (Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2B-2 to 6 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245
(West Supp. 1998); see also Gregory, supra note 46, at 370-71 (discussing various
grandparent visitation statutes).
231. See Kudler v. Smith, 643 P.2d 783, 786 (Colo. 1981) (denying visitation that had an
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would be appropriate based upon other statutory criteria including
whether the grandparent had personal contact with the child before
the petition for visitation was filed, whether visitation would
interfere with the parent/child relationship, and whether visitation
would be in the child's best interest.3 2
In Virginia, statutes governing visitation of minor children
authorize courts, in their discretion, to order visitation with
grandparents. 23 3  First, section 16.1-278.15 of the Virginia Code
provides that when a petition for visitation is pending, a Virginia
court may award visitation to any petitioner "with a legitimate
interest therein."234 Persons with legitimate interests include the
child's maternal and paternal grandparents.2 5 Consistent with
section 16.1-278.15, section 20-124.1 identifies grandparents as
"person[s] with a legitimate interest."23 6  Section 20-124.2(B)
provides that "[tihe court shall give due regard to the primacy of the
parent-child relationship but may upon a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be
served thereby award.., visitation to any other person with a
legitimate interest."23 7  These statutory commands survived
constitutional challenges at four levels of court review, from the
Montgomery County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District
Court to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 38
Case law also supports the theory that grandparents be
included among those who have a legitimate interest in a child.
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that grandparents
and other consanguineous relatives are persons who have "a
legitimate interest" in a child under section 16.1-241(a) of the
Virginia Code.23 9 First, the court held that the statute expressly
provides that the phrase shall include "grandparents and other
adverse effect on the grandchildren); Ward v. Dibble, 683 So. 2d 666,669 (Fla. 1996) (finding
no presumption of grandparent visitation and that visitation was not in the child's best
interest); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Va. 1998) (denying visitation in intact
families unless there is a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that there will be
"actual harm to the child's health and welfare" and that visitation would be in the child's best
interest); Elmer Jimmy S. v. Kenneth B., 483 S.E.2d 846, 849-50 (W. Va. 1997) (denying
grandparent visitation because certain limited circumstances had not been met).
232. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15(F) (Michie 1999).
233. See § 16.1-278.15(B).
234. Id.
235., See id.
236. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 1995) (mandating a broad construction of the
phrase "person with legitimate interest" to include grandparents).
237. § 20-124.2(B).
238. See Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 417-18 (Va. 1988). Actually, the Supreme
Court found "no constitutional infirmity in the applicable statutes .... " Id. at 418,
239. See Thrift v. Baldwin, 473 S.E.2d 715, 716 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
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blood relatives" as persons who have "a legitimate interest."240
Then the court ruled that "this term means not only a party
possessed of legal rights with respect to the child, but also any
party having a cognizable and reasonable interest in maintaining
a close relationship with the child."24' The court cautioned,
however, that its ruling "addresse[d] only standing to seek visita-
tion, not the right to enjoy visitation."242
Based on the plain meaning of the Virginia statutes and their
interpretation, Rebecca's grandparents and Callie's grandparents
are entitled to seek visitation. Under the circumstances, Callie's
grandparents have a better chance of receiving visitation because
Callie's parents are deceased. The Chittums and the Rogerses are
Callie's blood relatives. As her maternal and paternal grandpar-
ents, they have a genetic connection to Callie. Whitney Rogers gave
birth to another girl, Lindsey, after Callie was born. 243 Lindsey is
living with the Rogerses and Chittums on a rotating basis.2' Callie
could develop a relationship with her sister when she visits her
grandparents. They will be able to answer questions that she
certainly will have someday about her deceased parents. The
Rogerses and the Chittums could argue persuasively that if
Johnson receives permanent custody of Callie, there will be
detrimental harm if Callie's grandparents are not allowed to
maintain a relationship with Callie through visitation.
C. Siblings'Right to Visitation
Both Rebecca and Callie have siblings or half-siblings.245 In
several states, siblings may have visitation rights.246 In Virginia,
240. Id.
241. Id. Under this theory, the Rogers and Chittum families also could be able to visit
Rebecca. They would qualify as persons who have a legitimate interest because they have
established an emotional bond with Rebecca. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 22-23 (N.J.
1999); In re Zachary William R., 509 S.E.2d 897, 900 (W. Va. 1998).
242. Thrift, 473 S.E.2d at 716; see also O'Brien v. O'Brien, 684 A.2d 1352, 1353 (N.H. 1996)
(recognizing grandparents' standing); Kenyon v. Kenyon, 674 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (allowing visitation to grandparents who had spent a great deal of time with their
grandson); Williams, 501 S.E.2d at 417 (denying grandparents visitation without clear and
convincing evidence showing that visitation would serve the best interests of the child).
243. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
244. See id.
245. See id.; Cloud, supra note 6, at 64.
246. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.1(b) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that "any
order placing a child in foster care and providing reunification services shall include
provisions for sibling visitation if such visitation is not detrimental to the child"); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(b)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (empowering the court to allow
sibling visitation); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.2(a) (1999) (allowing visitation upon
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for instance, the child's relationship with siblings is a factor for
consideration when visitation and custody are disputed. 7 More-
over, in Virginia, the sibling's right to seek visitation under section
16.1-241(A) of the Virginia Code continues after adoption.248
In other states, siblings have a right to visit each other as long
as it is in the minor child's best interest to maintain contact with
her siblings. 9 New Jersey is one of those states that recognizes the
importance of sibling contact. 50 When some adult siblings sought
a visitation order to visit a younger sibling, a New Jersey court
concluded that sibling visitation is a "natural, inherent and
inalienable right."25'
D. The Need for a Written Visitation Plan
The parties who are responsible for Rebecca's and Callie's care
should agree upon specific rather than liberal visitation terms.
Dates, times, and restrictions, if any, should be agreed upon,
memorialized in writing, and approved by the court. For example,
because these families live ninety miles apart, transportation plans
should be made. Most often, vague visitation terms lead to
litigation of numerous disputes in court.26 2 Specificity would
decrease the likelihood of disputes about visitation in the future.253
Furthermore, because no adult on either side has had sufficient
time to development a relationship with Callie or Rebecca, a
adoption or foster care placement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C: 19-d (Supp. 1998) (granting
the court the ability to ensure that sibling relationships continue after placement in foster
homes); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1999) (giving siblings standing to petition the
court for visitation rights); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999)
(stating that the court may grant visitation to any person related to the child); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-5-24.4 (1996) (relating sibling rights in detail).
247. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(4) (Michie 1999); see also Christine D. Markel, Note,
A Quest for Sibling Visitation: Daniel Weber's Story, 18 WHrrTlER L. REV. 863, 877 (1997)
(applying the best interests standard to resolve sibling visitation issues).
248. See Thrift v. Baldwin, 473 S.E.2d 715, 716 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
249. See id.
250. See L. v. G., 497 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (concerning adult siblings who
wanted to visit minor siblings).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Broocke v. Broocke, 873 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (ordering the
trial court to define visitation terms in detail to avoid further litigation).
253. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(bXl) (1999) (stating that the court "shall specify a schedule
for visitation by the noncustodial parent"); Fanning v. Fanning, 504 So. 2d 737, 738-39 (Ala.
1987) (modifying original order to expand visitation into a more a detailed plan for
visitation); Broocke, 873 S.W.2d at 333 (noting that the trial court found that unsupervised
visitation would endanger the children and that a court-ordered supervised, structured
visitation plan was proper); Weber v. Weber, 457 S.E.2d 488, 489-90 (W. Va. 1995)
(determining the level of detail required based upon the "circumstances of each case").
34 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
gradual or phased-in visitation plan may be helpful. It would allow
the girls to get to know the other families and to feel comfortable
with them before they go to spend lengthy periods with them.2"
Like the families in Virginia, the Mayses and the Twiggs
initially had an amicable visitation plan, but eventually a tumultu-
ous relationship developed.255 Robert Mays was accused of interfer-
ing with the Twiggs' visitation rights after just five visits occurred
in 1990.2" Regina Twigg publicly accused the Mayses of intention-
ally swapping their unhealthy baby for a healthy one.257 She
published her accusations in letters to the editor of Kimberly's
hometown newspaper."' As an unfortunate result, Kimberly was
fully aware of all of those shenanigans.259 When the situation
escalated, Regina Twigg accused Robert Mays of child abuse and
made outrageous visitation demands.2 0 In short, "the relationship
between the parties went from deterioration to complete disintegra-
tion. ,26
1
Finally, allowing non-parent visitation may further complicate
matters in the Rogers/Johnson baby switch. As the children age,
visitation arrangements that are made now may need readjust-
ment. Arrangements may have to be modified when they enroll in
school. Also, if Callie or Rebecca decides that she does not want to
visit the other family, she should not be forced to go. "[Florced
visitation is likely to produce mental, physical, or emotional harm
of a lasting nature."262 In addition, "[ci oordinating schedules so that
children are all together in one household during any particular
visit is often impossible. Adding [other related and unrelated
persons] to the list of those, demanding time with the child may
result in an itinerary more complex and rigid than most adults
could tolerate."263
254. See In re Sundberg v. Sundberg, 946 P.2d 296, 299 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (suggesting
gradually increased unsupervised visitation for a child who had not known her father);
Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 326 (W. Va. 1989) (providing for a six-month transition
period).








262. Id. at *3; see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 23-27 (opposing forced
visitation).
263. Morris, supra note 229, at 13.
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VII. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND ADOPTION
When the mix-up was disclosed, these families had no intention
of changing the status quo or changing the girls' living arrange-
ments.2 If they continue to hold this view, permanent placement
arrangements should be made regarding these children. This
section discusses alternatives to a harsh, court-imposed custody
decision.
A. Termination of Parental Rights
Termination of parental rights is a permanent severance of a
biological parent's rights and obligations toward her child.265 The
severance may be voluntarily or involuntarily transacted in
accordance with statutory requirements. 66 Voluntary termination
is effectuated with the biological parents' written consent to give up
all fundamental rights that the United States Constitution and the
courts have bestowed.26 7 In comparison, to effect an involuntary
termination, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
parent is unfit and that placement with a non-parent is in the
child's best interest.268
Johnson, Conley, and Callie's biological grandparents stead-
fastly proclaimed that they would not switch the children again.26 9
If they maintain this position, Johnson and Conley should give their
written consent to voluntarily terminate their parental rights to
rear Rebecca. Rebecca's consent will not be necessary because she
is -not yet fourteen years old.27° As a consequence, neither Conley
264. See 20120: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
265. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 746, 748 (1982) (denying the right to physical
custody, visitation, or communication with the child or to regain custody).
266. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (finding constitutional a New York statute that
involuntarily terminated a parent's rights when a child is found to have been permanently
neglected); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1259 (N.J. 1999) (terminating a
biological mother's rights involuntarily by court order).
267. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(D)(2) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999) (denoting the
requirement for written consent prior to adoption, and giving a father the right to notice and
an opportunity to be heard unless his identity is "not reasonably ascertainable" or his
whereabouts are unknown); In re Adoption of K.M.W., 718 A.2d 332, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (denying grandparent's adoption petition until the mother relinquished her rights).
But see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225.1 (Michie Supp. 1999) (deciding whether consent is
withheld "contrary to the best interests of the child").
268. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Michie 1999); In re Adoption of a Child by P.S., 716
A.2d 1171, 1180 (N.J. App. Div. 1998); McEntire v. Redfearn, 227 S.E.2d 741, 744 (Va. 1976).
269. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
270. See VA CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(D)(4) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999).
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nor Johnson will be obligated to support Rebecca, and they will
forfeit all rights to make major decisions on her behalf.
On the other hand, the grandparents may be awarded custody
of Rebecca if Johnson's and Conley's rights are involuntarily
terminated. To be successful, the Rogerses and the Chittums must
show that Johnson and Conley are both unfit. Evidence of unfit-
ness could include indicia of Johnson's and Conley's inability or
unwillingness to feed and clothe Rebecca properly, to supervise her,
to protect her from harm, to provide habitable housing, to avoid
extreme discipline, and to refrain from immoral behavior that
would adversely affect Rebecca's well being.27'
Generally, courts have been loath to interfere with the
biological parent-child relationship.272 As previously stated,
biological parents usually obtain custody of their children and
retain their parental rights.273 On the other hand, when a child's
health or safety is at risk the state may intervene despite the
parent's constitutionally protected right to autonomous child
rearing.274
The facts in Bottoms v. Bottoms275 indicate circumstances under
which the Virginia Supreme Court will override a parent's rights
and grant custody to a grandparent. The court granted custody to
the child's maternal grandmother because it found that the
presumption in favor of the natural mother's custody was rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence of the mother's unfitness. 276 The
court awarded custody to this non-parent because the toddler used
profane language, and he screamed, cried, and held his breath until
he turned purple when his mother attempted to take him from his
grandmother's home. 7 7 The court also was persuaded to transfer
custody because his mother was unemployed most of the time and
was nomadic.2 78 Because of the mother's mobility, the child stayed
with his grandmother seventy percent of the time.2 79 In addition,
271. See Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H., 455 S.E.2d 570, 574 (W. Va. 1995).
272. See Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 420 (Va. 1998).
273. See id. at 418.
274. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (enforcing child labor
laws); Lecky v. Reed, 456 S.E.2d 538, 541 (Va. 1995) (protecting the child from "an unstable
and irresponsible lifestyle"); Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 409 S.E.2d 460,
463 (Va. 1991) (protecting the child from neglect).
275. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
276. See id. at 107.
277. See id. at 106.
278. See id. at 105.
279. See id.
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the mother had difficulty controlling her temper and struck the
child hard enough to leave fingerprints on him.2"'
The Rogerses and the Chittums have begun to spar against one
another for custody of Rebecca.281 If the court decides that neither
Conley nor Johnson should get custody of Rebecca, the court could
decide that the grandparents would get custody. In a custody battle
between the grandparents, the question posed would be whether it
is in Rebecca's best interest to be placed with either or both
families.282
Based on the information that is available at this time,
however, there is insufficient evidence that Johnson is unfit.
Therefore, involuntary termination of her rights is not likely. Also,
although Conley's access to Rebecca may be restricted if someone
demonstrates that his violent conduct toward Johnson is harmful
to Rebecca, his parental rights would not be terminated on that
basis alone.283
B. Adoption
Initially, Johnson, Conley, the Chittums, and the Rogerses
planned to rear the girls together as an extended family.28 ' At
times, they vehemently opposed adoption.28 5 On other occasions,
however, the Rogerses and the Chittums expressed an interest in
adopting Rebecca. 8  Recently, Johnson filed a petition to adopt
Callie.28 7 If Callie's grandparents and Johnson agree that the
grandparents should retain custody of Rebecca and that Callie
should permanently live with Johnson, adoption is the recom-
mended procedure.
280. See id. at 107-08 (expressing further concern regarding the "social condemnation"
that the child would suffer because his mother was engaged in "active lesbianism").
281. See Michael D. Shear, Custody Battle Underway for Switched Baby, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 1998, at B1.
282. See Farley v. Farley, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (Va. 1990).
283. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Michie 1999); see also Wright v. Alexandria Div. of Soc.
Serva., 433 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that party petitioning for
termination must prove that parental abuse or neglect threatens the child's life or well-
being).
284. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27; Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
285. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
286. See Grandparents Seek to Adopt Switched Baby, CNN.cOM (Aug. 19, 1998)
<http://cnn.com/US/9808/19/switched.babies.Olindex.html> (indicating that both paternal
and maternal grandparents contemplated adoption); Two Families, supra note 60 (expressing
the Rogerses' desire "to place in stone the legal status of these children").
287. See Shear, supra note 121.
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Adoption is encouraged for three reasons. First, under the
current arrangement, too many people are involved in resolving
potentially volatile issues. Often only two people, a mother and a
father, have to confront serious and ongoing disagreements about
custody, visitation, support, and other major issues regarding their
child's upbringing. Additional people only complicate such prob-
lems.
Already, these families disagree about some matters. Early on,
they disagreed about whether they would tell the girls about the
mix-up.288 Johnson said that she would tell Callie, whereas Brenda
Rogers said that she would not tell Rebecca. 289 Also, the paternal
and maternal grandparents disagreed about whether Rebecca
should submit to DNA testing.2 ° For days, the Chittums agreed to
allow testing while the Rogerses refused to give their consent.29'
They did not want to take the risk of learning that Rebecca was not
actually their biological granddaughter.292
The second reason that adoption is a highly recommended
procedure is that only one family should legally be responsible for
making decisions about each girl's education, religious upbringing,
parenting, and discipline. Likewise, one and only one family should
be legally responsible for each child's support and general welfare.
Such decisions would make it easier to enforce obligations if, in the
future, one of the adults balks at caring for the child for whom she
has assumed responsibility.
Third, although the adults in these children's lives have vowed
to love them and to rear them as extended family members,
sometimes hearts and minds change. To avoid further disruption,
each child should be adopted. Two years, two months, or even two
weeks after a living arrangement is made, it can be dissolved
without mutual consent if adoption has not been finalized.
Unfortunately, past relationships among these families signal
that other disputes are likely to resurface at anytime. Efforts to
overturn an agreement to care for Rebecca already have been
attempted.293 For the first few months after the switch was
discovered, the relationship between Johnson, Conley, and the
Rogers and Chittum families was amicable.294 In an effort to
288. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
289. See id.
290. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 65.
291. See id.
292. See id.; Michael D. Shear & Justin Blum, Tests Set for Child Feared Switched at
Birth, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1998, at D5.
293. See Supreme Court Refuses, supra note 122.
294. See 20/20: Switched at Birth, supra note 27.
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maintain familial harmony, they even excluded their attorneys from
meetings when they were getting to know each other.95 Later,
however, ambitious, harmonious, extended family plans deterio-
rated." 6 A fundamental disagreement arose between Rebecca's
grandparents when Tommy and Linda Rogers petitioned the court
for sole custody of Rebecca and Lindsey.297 In early November 1998,
the Rogerses, who had shared custody of Rebecca with the
Chittums, filed a petition to modify an earlier order of joint custody
to one of sole custody.29 The petition was filed just days before the
Rogerses were supposed to relinquish Rebecca to the Chittums for
the latter's four-month custody of the girls.2  One family member
posited that an underlying reason for the petition to modify the
custody arrangement was to prevent Johnson from visiting
Rebecca. 00 Another Chittum family member said that the
Rogerses' behavior has been "kind of sneaky and underhanded.
They don't know how to share, and they don't know how to cooper-
ate."3 ' Less than two weeks after the Rogerses filed their petition,
however, the dispute was resolved, and the Rogerses withdrew their
request for sole custody.
30 2
A few months later, in April 1999, the sparks started to fly
again. The Commonwealth of Virginia, on behalf of the Medical
Center, a state-run hospital, offered to pay two million dollars to
the guardians of each girl, with a small amount actually paid to the
guardians and the remainder held in trust for the girls. 03 Johnson
unsuccessfully tried to block the grandparents' decision to accept
the offer on Rebecca's behalf3 0 4 She argued that the Common-
wealth of Virginia should pay much more than two million
dollars.05 As a result of losing that argument, Johnson threatened,
through her attorney, to seek custody of Rebecca.0 6 She further
295. See Harris, supra note 11.
296. See Harris, supra note 9.
297. See id.
298. See id.; see also Update: Switched at Birth, TIME, Dec. 7, 1998, at 34, 34 (stating that
one set of grandparents filed for a change of custody from joint custody to sole custody).
299. See Harris, supra note 9.
300. See Shear, supra note 281.
301. Id.
302. See Custody Agreement in U-Va. Baby Switch, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1998, at C3.
303. See Shear, supra note 148.
304. See Supreme Court Refuses, supra note 122.
305. See Shear, supra note 148; Supreme Court Refuses, supra note 122. In fact, the
settlement was for Rebecca to get $200,000 up front and $400,000 in an annuity that would
be worth $1.5 million in 25 years. See id. The grandparents would share $125,000 and their
lawyer would get $150,000. See id.
306. See Shear, supra note 148.
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claimed that shuttling Rebecca between grandparents is not in
Rebecca's best interest and that acceptance of this settlement
demonstrates that the grandparents are not making decisions that
are most beneficial to Rebecca. 3 7
To prevent Rebecca and Callie from becoming pawns in other
custody battles, if no switchback is agreed upon, the grandparents
should adopt Rebecca. Likewise, Johnson should adopt Callie.
Adoption would protect the persons who obtain custody of Rebecca
and Callie from custody and visitation claims and unwanted
interference from others who claim a legitimate interest in the
children. The judge who decided Kimberly Mays's fate ruled that
the Mayses could commence an exparte adoption proceeding."0 ' The
same procedure should be followed with respect to Rebecca and
Callie.
Ideally, each child's adoption would be open3 9 so that if
Johnson, Conley, and the grandparents wanted to maintain contact
with either child and her adoptive family and share in all aspects
of the girls' lives, they could do so. l0 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia, however, has interpreted sections 63.1-233 and 63.1-220.2
of the Virginia Code to mean that when a biological parent's rights
are terminated, "the ties between the parent and child are severed
forever and the parent becomes a 'legal stranger to the child." 31
Section 63.1-233 of the Virginia Code explains the biological
parents' interests upon adoption. 12 Birth parents and all other
persons who had legal rights and obligations to a child are divested
of those rights and obligations.313 Also, for inheritance purposes,
307. See id.
308. See Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18,
1993).
309.. The court in Cage v. Harrisonburg Dept of Soc. Servs., 410 S.E.2d 405, 406 (Va. Ct.
App. 1991) defined "open adoption" as
a situation where the adoptive parents and the natural mother agree to terms
by which the natural mother can maintain contact with her children, at the
discretion of the adoptive parents. The adoptive parents would not be under
any legal obligation to allow the natural mother to visit or continue visits.
Id.
310. See id. at 406-07; see also James B. Boskey, The Ties That Bind: Untangling the
Rights of Natural Families in Adoption, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1989, at 16, 18, 45 (describing
situations in which an open adoption may be appropriate and explaining how the agreement
would be implemented).
311. Cage, 410 S.E.2d at 406-07 (quoting Lowe v. Richmond Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 343
S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 1986)); accord In re Melanie S., 712 A.2d 1036, 1037 (Me. 1998). Compare
MD. CODE ANN. FAm. LAw § 5-525.2 (1999) (allowing visitation rights for siblings of adoptees
upon adoption or foster care placement), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022, subd. 3 (West
1998) (terminating visitation unless child is adopted by a grandparent or a stepparent).
312. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-233 (Michie 1998).
313. See id.; see also Rocker v. Brown, No. 0392-98-2, 1998 WL 527070, at *1-2 (Va. Ct.
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each child will be considered a child of her adoptive parent(s)
instead of her biological parents.314 As a consequence, although
some other states would allow Johnson to maintain a relationship
with Rebecca after Rebecca's adoption, Virginia would not allow
Johnson to continue such a relationship because Virginia law does
not recognize open adoptions.31 5
There is another downside to adoption: it may have detrimen-
tal psychological effects on Rebecca and Callie. Some adoptees
develop strong feelings of abandonment, coupled with a strong
desire to know the circumstances under which their parents
consented to their adoption.316 "The search usually is for informa-
tion and not for a replacement relationship. In addition to discover-
ing the biological and medical aspects of their family background,
most adoptees want to know what happened to their birth parents
in order to gain knowledge about themselves."317 Great conflicts
develop in the child's mind, as when Kimberly Mays discovered that
she was not living with her biological parents. She ran away from
the home where she had lived for ten years in order to live with her
biological parents.318 Later, she ran away from the home of her
biological parents.31 9  Eventually, she reconciled with both
families.32 °
App. Aug 25, 1998) (finding that the mother of the birth father had no standing to sue for
legal rights to child given up for adoption); Thrift v. Baldwin, 473 S.E.2d 715, 716 (Va. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding that while adoption terminated the legal grandparental and sibling
relationship, those blood relatives still had standing to sue for visitation); Cage, 410 S.E.2d
at 406-07 (declaring that the Virginia adoption statute does not accommodate open
adoptions); Frye v. Spotte, 359 S.E.2d 315, 317 (Va.: Ct. App. 1987) (noting that when an
adoption becomes final, the parent no longer has legal rights in relation to the child).
314. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-71.1, 64.1-5.1 (Michie 1998); cf Hyman v. Glover, 348
S.E.2d 269, 274-75 (Va. 1986) (interpreting statutes to include adopted children unless they
are excluded in a will). See generally J. Rodney Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in
Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275 (1978) (discussing Virginia statutory law dealing with the
succession rights of children).
315. Virginia is not the only state that would terminate such a relationship. See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3102(c) (West 1999) (terminating visitation rights upon adoption by any person
other than a grandparent or stepparent); Vice v. Andrews, 945 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Ark. 1997)
(severing grandparent's statutory right to visitation after adoption); In re Ellis, 681 N.E.2d
1145, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize open adoptions in Indiana); People in
Interest of S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (S.D. 1995) (recognizing the concept in South Dakota
and discussing the split of authority among various states regarding whether open adoption
should be recognized).
316. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 183, at 24445 n.8 (quoting from an adoptee's letter
to syndicated newspaper advice columnist Ann Landers).
317. ALBERT J. SOLNIT ET AL., WHEN HOME Is No HAVEN 111 (1992).
318. See Do What's Best for Kids, Baby Swap Victim Urges, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.
Va.), Aug. 7, 1998, at 10A, available in 1998 WL 5966861.
319. See id.
320. See id.
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With respect to Rebecca, Johnson and Whitney Rogers noted
genetic links or differences from other family members.32' After she
saw a picture of Rebecca, her biological child, Johnson exclaimed,
"[sihe looks like me."322 Also, on more than one occasion, Rogers
had said, "I don't understand Rebecca. I don't know who she looks
like. Her personality-it's not like [our personality] .323 Relatives
had observed that Rebecca's "chunky" features were not like the
Rogerses' and Chittums' leaner features.324 Just as other family
members noticed differences, at some point Rebecca and her
playmates will notice differences, too. 325
Information about genetic ties is of critical importance to older
adoptees. At this stage in their lives, however, blood-ties are not as
important to Rebecca and Callie.
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of
blood-tie relationships until quite late in their development[;I.
what matters to them is the pattern of day-to-day inter-
changes with the adults who take care of them and who, on the
strength of such interactions, become the parent figures to
whom they are attached. 26
The unanswerable question is whether these girls will suffer
less in the future if genetic ties are allowed to trump psychological
bonds for custody purposes. Before any adoption could occur,
however, unless a court decides that they are unfit parents,
Johnson and Conley must relinquish their parental rights and give
their consent for Rebecca's adoption. Johnson and Conley, as
Rebecca's unmarried birth parents, would relinquish their parental
rights by preparing a written and notarized consent to the adoption.
Then they could recommend placement of Rebecca with the
321. See Blum & Shear, supra note 14; Richard Cohen, The Lure of Family Ties, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 1998, at A19.
322. Blum & Shear, supra note 1; see also Blum & Shear, supra note 14 (noting that
Johnson cried when she noticed the resemblance).
323. Blum & Shear, supra note 14.
324. See id.
325. See Cohen, supra note 321 (predicting that the girls will develop a "natural curiosity"
about their heritage).
326. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 9; see also ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY
BONDS 164-86 (1993) (disputing the existence of adoption stigmas and emphasis on genetic
ties); MIRIAM KOMAR, COMMUNICATING WITH THE ADOPTED CHILD 156-59 (1991) (expressing
the desire to belong to the adopted family); Baunach, supra note 52, at 511 (describing the
levels of awareness that occur during child development).
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adoptive parents of their choice.327 No consent is needed for Callie's
adoption because her parents are deceased.328
VIII. OTHER RIGHTS OF THE CHILDREN
A. Inheritance Rights and Social Security Benefits
All biological and adopted children have a right to inherit from
their parents' estate.329 Callie's parents, who were unmarried when
she was born, are deceased. Still, she is entitled to inherit from
their estates.m Before he died, Kevin Chittum was busily planning
to make a home for his family. He had purchased eight acres of
land, some furniture, and a big screen television."s1 He had bought
a house and had elicited some friends to assist him with renovating
it.332 Callie, as one of his biological children, is entitled to inherit a
portion of that property and any other property that her parents
owned. Furthermore, the Social Security Act provides that monthly
survivor benefits shall be paid to young, unmarried children.333
B. .Wrongful Death Benefits
There is some evidence that Kevin Chittum may have been
driving negligently minutes before the automobile collision that
claimed his life and the lives of six other people.334 Eyewitnesses
said that Chittum was attempting to pass a tractor-trailer as he
was driving Rogers's Honda in southbound traffic on Interstate 81
327. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.3(A) (Michie 1998).
328. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-226(G) (Michie 1998).
329. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-6.1(1) (Michie 1998); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 769-70, 776 (1977) (finding statute that excluded children born out of wedlock from
inheritance to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Marshall v. Bird, 334 S.E.2d
573, 575-76 (Va: 1985) (finding that Trimble implicitly overruled a similar Virginia statute).
330. See § 64.1-5.1(1).
331. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 65. But see Harris, supra note 9 (claiming that Chittum's
estate does not have any assets).
332. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
333. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §402(dXl) (1998); see also Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771-
72 (finding state statute excluding children born out-of-wedlock from inheritance
unconstitutional); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 2755, 2767 (1976) (allowing statutory
classifications that impose conditions on the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for
surviving child's insurance benefits); Shear, supra note 23 (reporting that Paula Johnson had
been contacted by Social Security officials and was informed that Callie Marie may be
entitled to Social Security Benefits as an orphan, and that Rebecca may also be eligible
because her "adoptive" parents are now deceased).
334. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14. Police told USA Today that Kevin Chittum was
not technically speeding but was going too fast on the wet highway. See Cloud, supra note
6, at 65.
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in Virginia.335 A rain storm had developed suddenly,36 and he lost
control of the car as it hydroplaned and struck a diesel fuel tank
truck.337 The collision caused both vehicles to careen off an
overpass and crash onto Route 11, a roadway that ran beneath the
overpass.338 Seven people died in the accident,339 including Rogers,
Chittum, and four young children they were taking to the state
fair.34 Jerry Douglas Gregory, the driver of the tractor-trailer, also
died.34' Gregory's survivors alleged that Chittum "failed to drive
the Honda according to the existing road conditions and weather.""42
As Rogers's biological child, Callie may have a right to sue
Chittum's estate for her mother's wrongful death. 1 3 Indeed Rogers'
estate has brought a wrongful death claim against Chittums'
estate.344 The court ruled that Lindsey and Callie shall share the
settlement.345
C. The Right to a Guardian ad Litem
A guardian ad litem (GAL) is appointed by a court to protect a
child's interests when custody and visitation are disputed.346 It is
the GAL's duty "to see that the interest of the child is [presented to
the court]. Th[e] child h[as] no other independent participant in the
proceeding, aside from the trial court, to protect his interests."347
335. See Cloud, supra note 6, at 65.
336. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. See Taimny Jarvis Hamilton, Trucker's Sons File $1 Million Lawsuit against Chittum
Estate, NEws-GAZETrE (Lexington, Virginia), Nov. 4, 1998, at All.
340. See Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
341. See Hamilton, supra note 339.
342. Id.; see also Harris, supra note 9 (stating that survivors of the children who were in
Kevih Chittum's car and the truck driver already have filed wrongful death actions).
343. See VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-53 (Michie 1998) (permitting an award of damages to the
decedent's children); Carroll v. Sneed, 179 S.E.2d 620, 623 (Va. Ct. App. 1971) (allowing a
child born out of wedlock to recover for father's wrongful death). But see Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 1509, 1511 (1968) (finding unconstitutional a statute that distinguished children
born out of wedlock from those born during marriage).
344. See Harris, supra note 9.
345. See id. (describing an award of two-thirds to Lindsey and the remainder to Callie).
346. See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 152 (Wyo. 1998) (describing how important the
,uardian ad litem is in representing child's best interest).
347. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (holding that the guardian's
recommendation, although not binding, should have been considered); see also Guier v.
Guier, 918 S.W.2d 940, 950 (Mo. 1996) (stating that the role of the guardian ad litem is to
"stand in the shoes of the child and weigh the factors as the child would weigh them if his
judgment were mature and he was not of tender years" and that his "function is to advocate"
the best interests of the child); Shainwald v. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. 1990)
(noting that children need a "vigorous advocate"); Doe v. Doe, 421 S.E.2d 913, 915 (Va. 1992)
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Under Virginia state law, however, a GAL will not be appointed
automatically when custody is at issue and each parent claiming
custody is represented by counsel."' Before a GAL is appointed, a
Virginia court must determine whether the parents' counsel can
adequately represent the child's interests. 9 At some point, it may
become clear that the adults involved in this custody dispute are
not acting in Rebecca's and Callie's best interests. If that ever
happens, a GAL should be appointed for each girl.
IX. MEDIATION-A METHOD TO FIND AN AMICABLE RESOLUTION
Johnson, Conley, and the members of the Chittum and Rogers
families-all persons who have a legitimate interest in obtaining
custody and visitation of Rebecca and Callie-have met
informally.35 They have exchanged photographs and stories about
the two children who are at the center of this controversy.35' Most
of the time, they have cooperated, communicated, and established
good rapport with one another.352 Thus, these families have taken
the first step toward an amicable resolution of the issues.
Parents settle ninety percent of custody disputes without court
intervention. 53 Mediation, one method of informal settlement, is
"a process through which an impartial and neutral third person
called a mediator encourages and assists disputants to negotiate a
settlement of their conflict."35  In accordance with statutory
commands in several states, mandatory or voluntary mediation may
be ordered in custody and visitation disputes such as this one.355
(finding that a guardian ad litem needs to safeguard the child's interests); Clark, 953 P.2d
at 152 (describing the guardian ad litem's role as "investigator, monitor, and champion for
the child").
348. See Verrocchio v. Verrocchio, 429 S.E.2d 482, 484-87 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing
the procedures, significance, and appropriateness of appointing a guardian ad litem).
349. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(D) (Michie 1999).
350. See Jerry Harris, Legal Issues Could Be Complex, NEwS-GAZETTE (Lexington,
Virginia), Aug. 8, 1998, at A3; Jones & Shear, supra note 14.
351. See 20/20: Switched at Birth 2, supra note 62; Harris, supra note 11.
352. See 20/20: Switched at Birth 2, supra note 62; Cloud, supra note 6, at 63.
353. See Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POLy' REV. 267, 286 (1987).
354. Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans "Are Not Carbon Copies" of White
Americans-The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 405, 408 (1998); see also ALA. CODE § 6-6-20(3)(a) (Supp. 1998)
(defining mediation).
355. See ALA. CODE § 6-6-20(b)(3) (Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5 (1)(c)
(1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-53a (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(b) (West
Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(2)(d) (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602(a)
(1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(2) (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
552.513(1) (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 518.619, subd. 1 (1990 & Supp. 1999); NEV. REV.
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The relevant Virginia statute provides that, "[mlediation shall be
used as an alternative to litigation where appropriate."""6 This
order is consistent with the informal efforts to resolve the issues
that arose as a result of the Mays/Twigg switch.5 7 To end the
dispute regarding which family would rear Kimberly, the Florida
court ordered the Twigg and Mays families to attempt to mediate
their differences.35 8
Mediation is a good method of conflict resolution for families
who want to resolve their own internal disputes.359 The main
advantage is that it fosters autonomous decision-making.360
Therefore, if the parties want to avoid the harsh rulings that a
court could be obligated by statute and case precedent to make,
they should mediate their claims. Mediation, a confidential
process, 6' would allow these families, who have shunned the local,
national, and international media attention that the baby switch
has generated, to avoid litigation and the continued barrage of
press stories., Thus, they could maintain their privacy. Further-
more, mediation of disputes results in faster disposition of family
matters,362 and the three families could resolve the issues in a less
painful manner.363
One of the greatest benefits of mediation is that after the
mediator drafts the agreement and the parties have an opportunity
to seek advice from their legal counsel, the agreement will be
submitted to a court for approval.3" The effect of the agreement
STAT. ANN. § 3.500(1) (Michie 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-5 (Michie 1999); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1(b) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-02 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.052(A) (West 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.765(1) (1996 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-5-29(a) (1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.015 (West 1997).
356. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(A) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); see also VA. CODE ANN. §
20-124.4 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998) (referring the parties to mediation "at no cost to the
parties"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.4 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (indicating procedure for
mediation).
357. See Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18,
1993).
358. See id.
359. See JOHN M. HAYNES & STEPHANIE CHARLESWORTH, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FAMILY
MEDIATION 2,3 (1996).
360. See id. at 2; FORREST S. MOSTEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO MEDIATION 33, 56-57
(1997).
361. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (Michie Supp. 1999) (making mediation
confidential); cf. MOSTEN, supra note 360, at 60-61 (indicating that some families choose
mediation to preserve their privacy).
362. See LINDA ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 16:12-13, at 23-24
(1997) (mediating disputes in 12 to 15 hours); MOSTEN, supra note 360, at 33 (averaging three
to eight hours for mediation).
363. See MOSTEN, supra note 360, at 60-61; Mabry, supra note 354, at 415.
364. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(A) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999).
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reached in mediation then will be as enforceable as any other
written contract." In the event that someone fails to comply with
one or more provisions of the agreement, adverse parties would be
able to enforce the agreement and obtain sanctions and remedies. 66
So, the adults involved will have a remedy if disputes develop later.
Mediation of disputes between Johnson and Conley may not be
appropriate, however, if screeners determine that Conley has an
abusive nature that would create an unequal bargaining power.
Some state legislation requires mediators or court officials to screen
disputants to ascertain whether there is a history of domestic
violence in the family.N7 If abuse has occurred, mediation may be
barred, in accordance with some statutes, or the abused person has
the option of refusing to participate in mediation. 8
At present, Johnson and Conley appear to have resolved their
differences and joined forces against the Chittums and Rogerses. 69
A mediator could assist the parties to resolve matters including
working out a detailed visitation plan. If they establish a plan for
these children on their own, they are more likely to honor that plan
in the future.
X. FAMILY COUNSELING: A PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALING
Regardless of the outcome of this controversy, counseling is
recommended for all interested parties. All of these adults, and
perhaps the children, have been traumatized by this travesty. Only
the family members know the real depth of their fears and anxi-
eties. Johnson has verbalized her emotions publicly more often
than other family members. She has described her pain as "more
than anyone should have to bear."37 She took several days leave
from work when she became aware of the DNA test results.3
These adults may need counseling to deal with their beliefs
about the medical profession. They may distrust medical employ-
365. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.11 to 12 (Michie Supp. 1999).
366. See id.
367. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.4 (Michie 1995) (requiring the court to "ascertain upon
motion of a party whether there is a history of family abuse").
368. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.4 (Michie 1995). For other examples of state statutes
that consider domestic violence a factor in determining whether a case should go to
mediation, see ALA. CODE §.6-6-20(d) (Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-311 (1) (1998);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5(a) (Supp. 1998); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.7A (West Supp. 1999); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.036 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4103(B)(1) (West Supp.
1999).
369. See Family Authorizes, supra note 41.
370. Blum & Shear, supra note 14.
371. See id.
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ees. This distrust is of major significance because Rebecca and
Callie are still toddlers. The likelihood that the children will
require some medical attention is quite high because many children
sustain bumps, bruises, scrapes, and broken bones as they grow.
At a minimum, annual medical examinations are a necessity.
Therefore, these parents and caregivers may need counseling to
assist them in renewing their faith in the medical profession.
Counseling may be beneficial for other reasons. The custody
and visitation plans have not been finalized.372 If one or more of the
parents, grandparents, or psychological parents voluntarily or
involuntarily gives up a child or contact with that child is dimin-
ished, she may need counseling to deal with the sense of loss that
she surely will feel. She may need assistance to come to grips with
separation from the child she has loved and nurtured for years.
These families have been bombarded by the media.373 At one
point, Johnson left town to get away from reporters.374 Both
Johnson and the grandparents were forced to hide and take refuge
from camera crews and reporters who staked out their homes.375 As
a result, the adults may need support to regain their confidence in
the public realm and to protect these children from other media
frenzies.
More important, the parties may agree, or a court may order,
that they maintain contact with each other through visitation or
some other arrangement. In that instance, they would have to
learn to communicate and cooperate with one another on a long-
term basis in a manner that will be in Rebecca's and Callie's best
interests. Additionally, as the girls mature, they may need
counseling to build positive relationships with all of the people who
care for them:
When family problems involving children are of sufficient depth
and duration that professional counseling is needed to heal the
relationships of the child or children with the parent or parents,
or to assist the child or children in dealing with such emotional
estrangement, a circuit court may direct participation in such
372. See Harris, supra note 9.
373. See Jerry Harris, National, International Media Descend on Area, NEWS-GAZETrE
(Lexington, Virginia), Aug. 5, 199S at Al (complaining about the invasion of privacy and
threatening to seek police protection); Deborah Kelly, Media Frenzy: "It's a Horror Show,"
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 1998, at Al (noting how the families were annoyed by the
media's constant intrusions in their lives); Michael D. Shear, Families Meet, Cry, Connect,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 9, 1998, at B1 (having a fearful five and one-half hour meeting and finding
something-reporters and cameramen-in common).
374. See Kelly, supra note 373.
375. See Harris, supra note 373.
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counseling and may in its discretion determine how the cost of
such counseling shall be paid.37
So, as other courts have required when parents have been sepa-
rated from their children,377 all adults who will have ongoing
contact with Callie and Rebecca should undergo counseling.
XI. CONCLUSION
Baby switches occurred before and after the Johnson/Chittum
and the Twigg/Mays switches.3"8 Days after the Johnson/Chittum
switch was discovered, a woman gave birth to a boy at a Lowell,
Massachusetts hospital."9 A few hours later, a nurse's aid brought
a baby to the mother for nursing.380 After the mother nursed the
newborn whom she thought was her own son, she decided to change
the child's diaper.38' When she loosened the diaper, she discovered
that the child she had nursed obviously was not her child.382 The
aid had brought the woman a female child. 3  When the mother
notified the hospital attendant, her son was found safely asleep in
the nursery.3 ' Hospital officials immediately offered to provide
counseling for the mother and to conduct DNA testing. 8 5
A second switch also occurred at the University of Virginia
Medical Center.386 Two infant girls died on or about the same date
in March 1998.38 When Mistie Fritz asked to take her baby home
for a burial service, she received a white plastic casket containing
376. Mary Ann P. v. William P., 475 S.E.2d 1, 8 (W. Va. 1996).
377. See generally Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988)
(mandating that all parties-child, surrogate mother and family, and adoptive
parents-participate in counseling as directed by a court-appointed mental health
professional); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 1998) (Hassell, J., dissenting) (noting
that juvenile & domestic relations court had mandated that parents and grandparents enter
counseling).
378. See, e.g., Carlos Santos, 2 Mothers Discuss U.Va. Experiences on 'Maury," RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 1998, at B7 (introducing South African mothers whose sons were
switched at birth)
379. See Wrong Baby (CNN Headline News television broadcast, Aug. 19, 1998), available







386. See Michael D. Shear, Babies'Bodies Switched at U.Va Hospital, WASH. POST, Sept.
5, 1998, at B1 [hereinafter Shear, Babies' Bodies Switched]; Michael D. Shear, In Latest U-
Va. Switch, Counsel from Other Case Retained, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1998, at C9.
387. See Shear, Babies' Bodies Switched, supra note 386.
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a deceased baby girl.' As she and her husband were about to leave
the hospital, they returned to claim their baby's blanket."s When
hospital employees searched for the blanket, they found it with
Fritz's baby elsewhere. Fritz had received someone else's deceased
child.390
Steve Kaufer of Inter/Action Associates, a consulting firm in
Las Vegas, Nevada, recently conducted a study of baby switches.39'
More than 400 employees at maternity wards across the nation
participated in the study.392 Kaufer found that employees made a
mistake in 1 out of 1000 times.3 93 "Almost none of those mistakes
are permanent, but every year two or three babies in the U.S.
probably go home with the wrong mothers."3 94 Hospital security
representatives predict that genetic testing may cause the number
of reported baby switches to increase.395 The Johnson/Chittum
switch will not be the last one.
In a court of law, a judge probably would award custody of
Rebecca to Johnson-Rebecca's biological mother. As the psycholog-
ical parent, she would receive custody of Callie too. These decisions
would be based upon case precedent, statutes, and policies designed
to promote each child's best interests. If the parties wish to avoid
this outcome, the adults who have vowed to care for these children
should mediate their disputes to resolve them in the manner in
which they choose and solidify the arrangement with a court order.
"There are times when the best interests of a child warrant
'fixing' his custodial arrangement."3 96  For genetic reasons and
because these young children will be resilient enough to overcome
the disruption that a switch will cause, Rebecca and Callie should
be switched so that they will grow up with their biological families.
The unrelated people who have developed a relationship with these
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Whatever these adults decide, these issues should be resolved
quickly because the longer they wait, the more trauma it may cause
Callie and Rebecca. A child's sense of time is much longer than an
adult's sense of time. For a child who is younger than five years
old, as these two girls are, "an absence of parents for more than two
months is intolerable."397 Moreover, the "bond between [Rebecca,
the Chittums, and the Rogerses] is growing stronger so that it will
be all the more traumatic for the child [if custody is returned to
[Johnson] ."ss
Rebecca and Callie are caught up in a great tragedy that will
affect them for life. Admittedly, it is difficult to predict what long-
term effects will plague them. In some respects, though, they are
blessed. Three families are vying to rear them and to do what is in
their best interests. For hundreds of thousands of children,
including approximately 100,000 who are available for adoption
from foster care, there is no one who wants to care for them on a
permanent basis. 9 As a judge lamented during another custody
dispute:
Both sets of grandparents are also to be commended for their
unselfish willingness to accept this child into their homes and
to aid in its upbringing. It goes without saying [that a decision
to grant custody] must of necessity bring joy to some and
sadness to others. We can only hope that the pain of separation
to be felt by the ... grandparents will in time subside as the
child adjusts to his new family setting, and that ways will be
found to keep alive the relationship they have established with
the child.400
397. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 183, at 41-43.
398. Bordley v. Blake, 478 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. 1985).
399. See 142 CONG. REC. H-4433 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady);
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